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Summary  findings
Numerous proposals have surfaced recently to  misplaced - with one exception: exploiting child labor
incorporate a clause about labor standards in the rules of  could expand exports in highly labor-intensive sectors.
the World Trade  Organization (WTO). Such a clause  But wage spillovers into industrial economy labor
would require each WTO member to recognize and  markets must be trivial, and there is no empirical
enforce certain core labor standards: forbidding forced  evidence that the use of child labor provides measurable
labor, discrimination, and the exploitation of child  competitive advantages.
workers and guaranteeing the rights of workers to  Do international trade sanctions serve a legitimate,
associate freely and engage in collective bargaining with  effective role in penalizing countries that fail to observe
employers. Failure to provide core labor standards would  core labor standards? Maskus points out that trade
subject a country to international trade sanictions.  restrictions are blunt, indirect instruments and may be
Maskus analyzes links between core labor standards  counterproductive,  harming the people they are designed
and international trade policy. He develops a series of  to help and ineffective in achieving stated goals.
simple models to see whether  limiting core labor  Thus, including in WTO rules a social clause
standards in export sectors of developing countries can  guaranteeing core labor standards would reduce global
improve the countries'  price competitiveness in export  efficiency for a small gain. Some approaches  - including
markets. He concludes that deficient provision of core  compensation programs from wealthy countries, focused
labor standards generally diminishes export  on poverty reduction and better access to education -
competitiveness rather than improving it, because of the  would be more effective and less costly than trade
distortionary effects of those deficiencies.  restrictions.
In other words, concerns about the negative impact on  At the same time, the International  Labor Organization
industrial countries of limited wage, employment, and  could improve its monitoring and publicity efforts, to
labor standards in developing countries are largely  raise international consciousness about labor standards.
This paper-a  product of the Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the group to analyze trade barriers
facing developing countries. Copies of the paper are available free from the 'World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,
DC 20433. Please contact Jennifer Ngaine, room NS-056, telephone 202-473-7947,  fax 202-522-1159,  Internet address
trade@worldbank.org.  August 1997. (83 pages)
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Issues  of  protection  for  workers'  fundamental  rights  are  again  prominent  in  the
international policy arena.  Broadly stated, there appears to be substantial international agreement
that certain core rights should be globally recognized and protected.  There is far less consensus
over means of ensuring such protection.  The main objective of this report is to analyze claims
about core workers'  rights and proposals to employ trade policies to advance them.  First,  I
discuss the nature of  fundamental workers'  rights and their reflection in core labor standards.
Second, I provide a series of analytical models about the potential economic impacts of limited
standards,  with particular reference to economic competitive advantage and trade.  With  this
analysis it becomes straightforward to demonstrate that trade sanctions can play only an indirect
and potentially counterproductive role in improving international labor protection.  Alternative
mechanisms focused directly on alleviating poverty and improving educational opportunities are
likely to  be  more effective.  Third,  I review major  international institutional frameworks  of
relevance for labor standards.
International  economists  have  long  claimed  that  the  linkages  between  varying
international standards for labor protection and international trade policy, both in theoretical and
empirical terms, are tenuous.  As detailed in this report, the potential benefits from making such
linkages are limited while the potential costs from doing so are high.  Nonetheless, the issue has
surfaced periodically  at the  forefront  of  debates  about the  role  of  trade  policy  in  ensuring
desirable social outcomes.
Repressive labor-market practices in developing countries  are seen by some observers as
providing  an  "artificial"  advantage to  exporting finms.  It  is  conceivable that  such behavior
contributes to declining demand for lower-skilled labor in the rich nations.  Further, to the extent
that these practices place downward pressure on labor standards elsewhere, other countries may
find it hard to sustain their higher levels of labor protection without incurring additional costs.
Accordingly,  there are numerous proposals for moving toward harmonized international labor
standards, supported and disciplined by trade sanctions.
Interest in minimum global labor standards arises for altruistic reasons as well. There is
growing awareness among consumers in the developed countries of the often appalling nature of
working conditions in a number of developing nations.  Clearly, therefore, the issue of defining
trade policy's role in protecting worker's rights will remain in the public consciousness and some
kind of resolution must be advanced and defended, even if it involves maintaining a separation
between the two policy areas.  Thus,  even if the economic case for a linkage between trade
policy and labor standards is weak, the political case may be overwhelming in the absence of
alternative mechanisms for improving labor standards around the world.
In Section 2 I discuss the meaning of labor standards and provide a  categorization for
purposes of organizing later discussion.  In Section 3 I analyze the operation of labor standards
and their prospective linkages to trade policy, using partial-equilibrium and general-equilibrium
trade theory.  I focus particularly on the economic and trade impacts of limited labor protection.
1Two  primary  questions  are addressed.  First,  does a  policy  of  providing  weak core  labor
standards improve competitiveness? Interestingly, in several situations this policy could actually
worsen competitiveness and reduce exports.  Second, what  are the effects of trade  sanctions
imposed by importing nations on countries that fail to adopt and enforce strong standards?  In
many cases such sanctions would be counterproductive in addition to being an indirect approach
to the problem.  I  also indicate where further research would be most useful in clarifying the
efficiency aspects of labor standards.  In Section 4 I review the relevant international institutions
influencing policies and thinking about labor standards and international trade.  In Section 5 I
draw  some conclusions.  The basic conclusion is that it would be  a mistake to  incorporate a
clause covering  rules on the provision  of labor protection into the World  Trade Organization
(WTO).  More  appropriate and effective means of inducing changes in  offensive practices are
available, in principle.
2.  Classifying  Labor  Problems  and Labor  Standards
It is useful to begin  by describing the collection of problems in labor markets that are
claimed to persist because of limited standards of labor protection.  While it is fair to claim that
these problems exist most prominently in poor countries, many of them persist in rich countries
as well.
2. a  Limited Protection  for  Workers' Rights
Exploitation of Child Labor
Children work in virtually all countries but the terms under which they work and the ages
at  which they  are  likely  to  enter  the  work  force vary  considerably  across  nations.  Richer
countries  tend  to  enforce  more  strongly  their  compulsory  schooling  laws,  with  mandatory
schooling  extending  through  a  later  age.  They  also  enforce  minimum-age  laws  regarding
working for commercial enterprises, but there are typically exceptions for family enterprises and
farms.  Young  workers  in  commercial enterprises  are  generally covered  by  minimum-wage
regulations and sometimes are the subject of other protective regulations, including limitations on
hours and night work.
Similar laws, perhaps with weaker provisions such as lower minimum age requirements,
exist widely in poor countries.  However, these regulations tend to be less strongly enforced, in
part because developing economies often have significant informal sectors in which regulations
have little meaning or  force.  It  is common for children to  leave school before the minimum
mandatory schooling is completed in order to enter the work force. Poverty generally means that
families find the contributions of children to household income to be essential for subsistence.
Accordingly, parents may pressure children to work at young ages.  This problem is exacerbated
For example, the minimum working age in Egypt is 12 years.
2if  schooling fees  are relatively expensive or if schooling is of ineffective quality.  Of course,
many  children  may  not  be  members  of  intact  families,  placing  them  into  a  position  of
independent decision-making at an early age.  For these children, work may be essential, even if
it is dangerous street work.
That  many children  work  in developing countries  is well-documented. 2 For  obvious
reasons, data on this problem are scarce and fragmentary.  The International Labor Organization
(ILO) estimates that there are between 100 million and 200 million people under age 15 working
in the world.  Of these young workers,  95% are located in developing countries,  with half of
these in Asia.  Child labor is estimated to make up 17% of the work force in Africa.  Children
rarely work in large-scale enterprises in the formal sector, except for assembly factories making
labor-intensive goods (e.g.,  clothing and toys) in a few countries (U.S.  Department of Labor,
1994).  Rather,  they  are  overwhelmingly  located  in  agriculture  (both  family  farms  and
plantations) and in informal-sector services, such as street vending, restaurants, domestic service,
and sub-contracted manufacturing.  Working conditions are often appalling, including long hours
that interfere with schooling, hazardous and repetitive jobs,  and meager pay.  It is common in
many countries for children to be apprenticed at very young ages in order to learn a trade, such
as  carpet-making  and  garment-sewing,  but  such  apprenticeships can  be  long-lasting,  often
unpaid, and poorly monitored.
Bonded Labor and Slavery
Slavery is illegal throughout the world but still exists in some places. 3 More common is
the related institution of bonded labor, in which people pledge their labor services for a period of
time in order to discharge a debt.  Often the time period becomes open-ended because the labor
service is implicitly valued at no more than the interest on the debt, with the sustained principal
becoming  a de facto  property right to  workers.  Further,  there  are reports  that this  form  of
forced labor  can  extend through  generations because the  debt is  passed  on from  parents to
children.  Bonded labor is reported to be common in poor areas of Pakistan, Bangladesh, India,
Thailand, the Philippines, and elsewhere.
Prison Labor
The use of prison labor is common throughout the world.  Indeed, in many states in the
United States prison work  is seen  as a key  component of rehabilitation.  The primary  issues
relate to the extent to which prisoners  can choose not to work or to  influence the conditions
2This is a vast literature,  much of it reported  in the popular  media.  Extensive  surveys are provided in U.S.
Department  of Labor (1992, 1994,  1995)  and International  Labour  Organisation  (1996).
3For  example, as reported on National  Public Radio (June 20, 1996), two reporters from The Baltimore Sun
recently  purchased  two boys for approximately  $500 in the Sudan,  who were then set free.  The reporters indicated
that the Sudanese  government  encouraged  members of its militia to consider  people taken in villages in areas of
insurrection  to be their personal property as a  form of monetary  compensation  for (otherwise  unpaid) military
service. There are also  common  reports, though  little systematic  evidence,  of brokers  buying  or kidnapping  children
in rural areas  of poor Asian  countries  and then  selling  them  into  prostitution,  domestic  service,  and the like.
3under which they work, and the ways in which the output of prison labor is used.  Regarding the
latter issue, allegations are commonly made that products made by prison labor in poor countries
in Asia,  especially China,  make their  way directly or indirectly into commercial markets and
exports.
Discrimination
Discrimination  is  the  practice  of  setting  different  working  conditions,  access  to
employment,  and wages  for different laborers on the basis of  some characteristic that  is not
evidently related to the ability to perform the work, such as gender or race.  Again, prohibitions
against discrimination  are common  in  the  world,  but  discrimination  persists.  At  times  the
discrimnination  is  sponsored by governments  (e.g.,  job  set-asides in  the United States,  ethnic
preferences  in  Malaysia)  in  an  effort to  achieve some  social goal.  In  the  context  of  labor
standards,  however,  complaints persist about discrimination in the marketplace, against which
governments seem to take little action.
Absence or Repression of Organizing and Bargaining Rights
Workers are often limited in their abilities to form labor associations and to bargain with
employers  over  wages  and  working  conditions.  Almost  by  definition,  child  workers  and
employees in the informal sector are prevented from doing so by the nature of the labor markets
and  enterprises  in  which  they  work.  Even  in  the  larger  enterprises  in  the  formal  sector,
however, organizing rights are often poorly recognized or enforced, while rights to strike can be
seriously attenuated by government actions (OECD,  1996).  Indeed, some governments  view
limitations on organizing rights  in particular sectors  (e.g.,  electronics in Malaysia) or  within
specially designated  regions,  such as export-processing zones  (EPZs,  common  in  China,  the
Philippines,  Mexico,  and  elsewhere)  to  be  an  important  component  of  export-promotion
programs.
Poor Working Conditions
Weak standards covering child labor and organization rights may lead to the persistence
of undesirable working conditions (long hours, unpaid and forced overtime, hazardous jobs  in
terms of injury and toxic exposure, inadequate provision of water, sanitation, and rest time, little
health care or day-care) that are insufficiently compensated in wages.  Such working conditions
are common in poor countries, though they exist in impoverished areas of wealthy countries as
well.  Further important working conditions include how wages are set and whether a legislated,
binding minimum wage is required.
2. b.  Classification of Labor Standards
A useful classification of labor standards is in Table 1, which is modified from  Portes
(1990).  The first category, called "basic rights,"  constitutes elements that are widely claimed to
enjoy universal acceptance as fundamental human rights.  These elements include freedom from
coerced  labor  (slavery and bonded  labor),  freedom  from  discrimination,  and  the  absence of
exploitative use of child labor.  Indeed, they are  recognized as human rights  in various U.N.
4declarations that have been widely ratified, suggesting widespread acceptance of the principles
involved. 4 As  such,  they comprise a  set of minimum rights  that all countries,  regardless of
economic situation or cultural values, are expected to provide in their labor legislation.  There
remains some gray area since definitions of what constitutes exploitation of child labor are not
uniform across countries.  Social conventions about the positions of persons of different genders
and ethnic backgrounds in the workplace differ as well.
The second group constitutes "civic rights," which refer to labor's position vis-a-vis firm
management.  Again,  it is widely accepted (and enshrined in the  U.N.  Declarations) that  if
workers are prevented from organizing freely and bargaining collectively with management, they
are deprived of a crucial form of exercising choice in the workplace and of being protected from
coercion.  In this context,  and defining exploitation of child labor as employment that in some
substantive way does not involve free choice by the child and her family, the first two groups of
rights  are typically considered fundamental workers'  rights that should be observed as a floor
level  of  labor  protection  by  all  nations.  In  Sengenberger's  (1995)  terminology,  these  are
"elementary standards."  It must be  noted, however,  that considerable disagreement exists  in
different nations about the framework defining freedom of collective action by employees.  For
example, if employers are free to fire and replace striking workers the strength of employees'
collective action is questionable.
"Survival rights"  and "security rights" go on to define conditions of work that, in most
instances, would  be  expected to  improve worker well-being but do  not  refer to  situations in
which the worker  is  denied freedom of choice. Sengenberger refers to these as  "substantive"
standards and most analysts seem to agree that substantial discretion should be left to countries in
selecting their levels to be  consistent with levels of economic development and social choice.
However,  Fields (1995) argues that it is an act of compulsion for firms not to reveal  the risk
characteristics inherent in the jobs they offer to employees, so that information revelation should
be considered a fundamental right of the worker.  Other observers argue that the provision of
effective occupational safety and health should be considered a fundamental right for labor.  Still
others point to the need for a minimum wage that provides at least a "living wage" for employees
as a fundamental privilege of labor.
These considerations lead most analysts to posit a set of core labor standards (CLS) that
are presumed to be incumbent on all countries to sustain and which are the focus of debate over
their relationship to trade policy.  A useful summary is provided by the OECD (1996):
1. Prohibition of slavery and compulsory labor, such as bonded labor;
2. Nondiscrimination in employment among genders, ethnic groups, and so on;
3. Prohibition of exploitative forms of child labor;
4. Freedom of association (the right to organize workers' groups);
5. Freedom of collective bargaining over working conditions.
4Covenant  on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966); Covenant  on Civil and Political Rights (1966);
Convention  on Rights  of the Child  (1989).
5That  these  provisions  should be  considered  "core"  or  "universal"  labor  standards  is
justified  in two ways.  First,  they reflect some shared global vision of morality,  as suggested
above.  Since nearly all countries have recognized these rights as humane principles within the
UN  Declarations,  they  are  often  called  "internationally  recognized  workers'  rights."  As
discussed in Section 4, however, international ratification of related Conventions promulgated by
the International Labor  Organization (ILO) is far  from uniform.  This  situation suggests that,
while there might be widespread support of the principle of CLS, there is much less agreement
over the need for, and form of, minimum international standards.
Second, these principles could underpin the efficient operation of labor markets.  Except
(perhaps)  for  elimination of  exploitative child labor,  observation  of  each  of  the  other  core
standards removes constraints on choices facing laborers in the economy and also removes from
employers  access to  anti-competitive employment practices.  Accordingly,  we  would  expect
workers  to  be  employed more  efficiently than in  the absence of CLS  and for  welfare  to  be
higher.5 These conclusions must be qualified in the case of freedom of association and collective
bargaining,  however.  It  is possible that the institutional framework of labor markets permits
labor unions to introduce inefficiencies into the economy, including  distortions in labor supply.
Thus,  the  appropriate  statement is  that  CLS  raise  efficiency  if  the  underlying  institutional
framework does not encourage such distortions.  In this context, the CLS operate as "framework
conditions" in the labor market (OECD, 1996), without which the economy may not operate on
the efficient frontier. Standards adopted beyond this level build upon this framework, depending
on the particular economic conditions of each country.
Gray areas inevitably accompany issues of morality.  The core labor standard that gives
economists greatest pause is the exploitation of child labor. Prohibition of child labor under  a
certain age is problematic,  despite the implicit assumption that young children are incapable of
making  inforned  decisions, both because sensible minimum-age standards  surely  would vary
across  countries,  industries,  and  ownership  structures,  and  because  a  mandated  minimum
working age imposes a constraint on children that fails to recognize the limited alternatives they
may have.
Some treatments of  child workers are universally condemned as  exploitative, such  as
kidnapping,  delivery  into bonded  servitude  or  prostitution,  and  work  that  imposes  physical
dangers that young children are incapable of handling. A broader definition would involve any
activity that  employs young children in  long hours  in dangerous  conditions, or  in jobs  with
excessive responsibility,  or  in ways that reduce educational opportunity, or  in ways that limit
social,  psychological,  and  physical  development.  Such  definitions  have  some  economic
justification  to  the  extent  that  prohibiting  such  activity  would  improve  the  educational
opportunities  and  health  status  of  children,  with  a  consequent  important  gain  in  dynamic
productivity for the economy.  However, these desirable outcomes may well not be the result of
such a prohibition.  It  should also be  recognized that decisions about child labor  supply are
5See Swinnerton (1996) for a basic analysis of this proposition.
6typically made by families.  An impoverished household could well find it rational to allow its
children  to  work,  even taking into account  educational alternatives and  market  constraints.
Hence,  the inclusion of limitations on child labor as a core labor standard remains debatable,
though I treat it as one.
It  should be  noted also that the efficiency gains from permitting  collective bargaining
depend on the objectives and practices of labor unions, as discussed further in Section 3.  Thus,
the  outcome  of  protecting  this  core  labor  standard  may  not  be  economically  efficient.
Nonetheless, restrictions on organization and collective bargaining do prevent the exercise of a
valid form  of choice in labor markets.  Hence, the inclusion of these rights as CLS is largely
uncontroversial.6
In  summary,  core  labor  standards  share  two  important  characteristics.  First,  the
principles they embody command universal respect as a matter of humane treatment of laborers.
Second, their observance is capable of improving the choice set of workers, thereby enhancing
both  static  and  dynamic efficiency.  At  this  level of  analysis,  there  seems  to  be  widespread
international agreement, though there are numerous practical difficulties in giving form to these
CLS, as the discussion in Section 4 will suggest.
2. c.  International Trade Issues
That  labor  standards,  working conditions,  and employment practices  vary  around  the
world is clear.  However, the main question underlying this report relates to the international
economic implications of  this  fact.  At this  point,  therefore,  it is appropriate to  set  out  the
international trade issues that emerge.
6Recognize,  however,  that  resistance  to rights  to free association  can be based as easily  on political  concerns  as on
economic  inefficiency. For example, the Polish government  resisted Solidarity  because of its fear of that labor
union's political  agenda.
7TABLE 1: TYPES OF LABOR STANDARDS
Type  Examples
1. Basic Rights  Right against involuntary servitude
Right against physical coercion
Right to compete without discrimination
Right against exploitative use of child labor
2. Civic Rights  Right to free association
Right to collective representation
Right to free expression of grievances
3. Survival Rights  Right to a living wage
Right to full information about hazards of job conditions
Right to accident compensation
Right to limited hours and work week
4. Security Rights  Right against arbitrary dismissal
Right to retirement compensation
Right to survivors' compensation
Source: modified from Portes (1990).
First,  to the extent that individuals in different countries are bothered by the use of child
labor and limited worker rights, there is a spillover impact across levels of national welfare. It is
clear  that  the  demand for  strong labor  standards rises  with  per-capita income  (or  economic
development).  Accordingly, one would expect some disutility among rich-country consumers as
they become aware of labor conditions in poor countries. This  altruism lies at the root of much
of the current advocacy of strong international labor standards.
Also  important  are  claims  that  limited  labor  standards  in  poor  countries  generate
"artificially" low wages and contribute to the natural comparative advantage low-wage nations
have in labor-intensive goods in international trade.  This additional wage margin is then seen as
a potentially important determinant of competition for unionized and/or low-skilled workers in
the developed economies.  This spillover through trade is viewed as a threat to employment and
incomes of such workers.
8It  is  feared that  as  trade  expands with  countries maintaining  weak  labor  standards,
competitive pressures will be placed on the higher-standards countries to relax their regulations.
The notion is that multinational enterprises (MNEs) search the world for competitive locations to
produce.  In the context of labor-intensive goods, MNEs locate in low-wage countries;  to the
extent these wages are repressed by weak labor standards, jobs are displaced among low-skilled
workers in the rich countries.  Accordingly, authorities in the rich countries find it necessary to
lower their labor-protection rights in turn  in order to attract or retain employers, or to pay an
economic price to sustain the higher standards.
Finally, these international impacts have resulted in growing calls for trade restrictions as
a  means of dealing with  them.  Those  consumers who are bothered by production processes
abroad sometimes advocate import bans in the offending products. Supporters of high standards
see trade restrictions as a means of sustaining the standards or limiting the price of sustaining
them.  A  more  sophisticated  variant  of  this  argument  is  that  trade  restrictions  could
simultaneously reduce  opposition by  local firms  to  raising home  standards  and  increase the
incentive for foreign frms  and governments to enact higher standards abroad for fear of losing
market access (Anderson, 1995; Steil, 1994).  And there seems little doubt that, to some extent,
proposals for  placing trade  barriers against exports  of low-standard countries are an effort to
sustain incomes of unionized and/or low-skilled workers in the rich countries.
It  is also argued that an  international trade agreement covering labor  standards would
help maintain broad support within the rich countries for the multilateral trading system.  In this
view, failures by exporting countries to implement CLS constitute an unfair trade practice that
erodes confidence in the system as consumers become more aware of the issue and competing
workers come  under  greater  pressure.  A  trade  agreement could convince  workers  in  high-
standards countries that they are not competing with workers who face deficient CLS.  This
might raise the former group's  support for freer trade.  In this context, the main international
trade issue becomes whether and how to incorporate into the World Trade Organization (WTO)
rules on labor standards.  This is a complicated issue in itself, to which I devote considerable
attention in Section 4.
2.d.  The Particular Case of Export Processing Zones
Many of the arguments made above refer particularly to the operations of firms in export
processing  zones (EPZs).  Because this  issue is controversial,  it is important to  consider the
evidence early in the report.7 Further analysis is provided in Section 3.
EPZs (also called Special Economic Zones, Duty-Free Zones, Industrial Free Zones,  and
Maquiladoras, among other names) exist in over 70 developing countries.  A useful definition is
provided by UNCTAD (1993, p. 5):
7See  UNCTAD  (1993),  Warr (1987),  and  Johansson  (1994).
9"The definition of an EPZ which conforms most closely to the original concept is that of
a  well-defined geographical area,  enjoying customs privileges and  other incentives, in
which the primary activity is processing of goods for export. "
According to UNCTAD,  the main objective of governments in establishing EPZs  is to
attract FDI  in  order to promote manufacturing exports, generate foreign exchange, and create
employment for cheap, low-skilled labor in depressed regions.  It is hoped that EPZs will attract
new  technologies  and  impart  better  management  techniques  to  local  workers,  along  with
improved work skills.  Countries also point to the possibility of backward linkages to domestic
supply sources and sub-contractors.  To achieve such goals, the EPZs offer streamlined approval
for  FDI  projects,  public  financing  of  facility upgrades  and  infrastructure,  fiscal  incentives,
including  lower  taxes  and  input  and  production  subsidies,  and  tariff  rebates  on  imported
intermediates.  The formation of EPZs  has also been encouraged by tariff preferences in  the
United States and the EU.
EPZs  overwhelmingly involve assembly operations for export.  EPZs  attract primarily
highly labor-intensive activities, including apparel, textiles, footwear, electronics assembly, some
types of food processing, and data-processing services.  However, industrial firms in less labor-
intensive sectors exist in EPZs as well, including pharmaceuticals. Employment for assembly is
dominated by female workers; UNCTAD (1993) claims that 70-90% of employees in EPZs in
developing countries are female.  Labor turnover is rapid as females leave for marriage or move
8 on  to  better  employment.  Unionization  rates  tend  to  be  low,  both  in  countries  where
governments actively  discourage union  organization and  strike  rights  (OECD,  1996) and  in
countries where such rights are protected.  The latter observation points to the inherent difficulty
in organizing workers from an elastic labor pool with high turnover rates.  Wages and conditions
of  work vary  considerably by  country and  industry.  Where  problems with  low wages and
hazardous working  conditions are frequent, the problem seems more to be  one of  inadequate
inspection and enforcement by the authorities, rather than limited national labor laws.
There are cases, however, in which governments choose to suspend or modify labor laws
inside EPZs in the evident hope that this limitation on labor rights will attract investment. There
is no systematic evidence that this policy is effective or ineffective.  Finally, the notion that firms
in EPZs  are exclusively owned by foreign capital is misleading.  Currently over two-thirds of
such firms are locally-owned or joint ventures between local and foreign capital.  It is clear that
the primary  inducement to such FDI  is the pool of low-wage, trainable labor.  According to
UNCTAD, these firms are far less "footloose" than is commonly supposed.
8According to Romero (1995, p. 249), many workers tend to view jobs in the EPZs as a  "stepping stone to better
employment opportunities and career prospects elsewhere.
10Wages and Hours
The preponderance of evidence indicates that firms in EPZs pay higher wages and offer
less onerous working conditions than do firms in the remainder of the country.  The OECD
(1996) reviews evidence that wages in EPZs tend to be higher than those outside EPZs.  Romero
(1995) also cites ILO  surveys that find wages and benefits are generally higher in  EPZs than
outside them, although this depends on the industrial activity, particular company policies,  and
the country of location (including that country's  labor laws).  At the same time, critics of weak
labor  standards  have  claimed  that  wages  (and  benefits)  are  lower  in  EPZs,  and  working
conditions are worse, than in the rest of the formal economy.
Romero (1995, p. 253) notes that "there are several reason why average wages in EPZs
are generally higher than those outside the zones. "  These reasons include:
a.  Firms in EPZs tend to provide productivity incentives (payments for piece work) and
overtime bonuses (note, however, that critics charge that excessive piece-work targets are
abusive);
b.  Finns  in EPZs tend to be considerably larger than like firms outside the EPZs.  Pay
scales and working conditions tend to rise with firm size due to scale economies in both
outputs,  affecting wages positively, and in organization of benefits and also to the fact
that large firms are more likely to be regulated effectively;
c.  Company policies in  foreign-owned firms and joint  ventures often call  for  higher
wages and better working conditions than in the surrounding economy, evidently because
such firms desire to attract and train semi-skilled workers and because such firms tend to
be bound by their headquarters into "best practices" in labor standards (this is most likely
if the headquarters firm is from an OECD nation);
d.  Wages tend to rise within EPZs more rapidly than in firms located outside the zones
during periods of labor shortages;
e.  Some countries have set higher minimum wages in EPZs than elsewhere in the belief
that this would help establish more stable and productive work forces.
There are at least two other reasons why wages in EPZ firms would exceed those in firms
in surrounding areas.  First, competitive pressures in labor markets force firms in EPZs to pay a
compensating differential to entice workers to move into the area.  Second, because such firms
produce  for  export they  face pressure  to  maintain higher  product quality.  To  induce more
sustained effort from  workers and to  avoid shirking these firms likely pay higher wages than
firms producing for the domestic market.9
9Aitken,  et al (1996)  provide  evidence  that  MNE  subsidiaries  in Mexico  and  Venezuela  pay higher  wages  than
local firms in similar  industries.
11Finally, it is critically important to note that if firms in EPZs attempted to suppress wages
below  equilibrium  levels,  they would  face constraints in  attracting  labor,  as  the models  in
Section  3  demonstrate.  The  impact  would  be  to  reduce  employment,  output,  and
competitiveness, rather than to raise them as is often claimed.
However, there are also cases in which EPZ firms have been found to provide pay levels
that  are  inferior  to  those  of  comparable local  enterprises.  This  appears to  happen both  in
countries with liberal wage policies and in those with minimum-wage legislation.  Reasons for
this phenomenon appear to include:
a.  Minimum wages are not enforced within EPZs or lower minimums are set;
b.  Limited  trade  union  rights  inhibit  collective  bargaining  within  certain  EPZs
(presumably this situation must coexist with stronger rights elsewhere in order to support
lower EPZ wages);
c.  Inspection procedures are lax in many nations.
Neither Romero (1995) nor UNCTAD (1993) mentions the existence of barriers to labor
migration between EPZs and the remainder of the country.  It is often alleged that national or
local  labor  regulations  (location permits,  identification cards,  and  guarded  fences) make  it
difficult  for  workers  to  enter  or  exit  industrial  enclaves.  I  found  no  credible  analysis  or
systematic evidence that this is true.  However, given the preponderance of evidence that wages
are higher in EPZs,  presumably such restrictions exist to limit entry of workers, rather than to
force them to remain in the area.
Union Rights
Romero (1995, p. 259) claims that workers in virtually all EPZs in the world have a legal
right to form and join trade unions  In fact, a strong majority of countries that host EPZs have
also ratified ILO Conventions number 87 and number 98,  which cover association rights  (see
Section 4).  In some countries unionization rates in EPZs  are little different from the general
economy, while in a few the rates are higher. Overall, however, EPZs tend to experience low
unionization rates, both because of the difficulty or organizing such labor forces and due to lax
enforcement of organizing rights.  Again, some countries exempt or relax their labor laws from
application in  EPZs (Malaysia, Mauritius, and  Zimbabwe are examples).  Rights to  strike are
attenuated in some countries by imposing compulsory arbitration, declaring EPZ  industries as
"essential" or declaring EPZs to be strike-free zones (OECD, 1996).  It also appears that in some
EPZs  where  union  rights  are  protected and  wages  and  working  conditions  are  better  than
average, employees prefer not to join or form unions for fear of being pushed into the remainder
of the economy.
12Occupational  Safety  and Health (OSH)
There is a strong positive correlation between the adequacy of working conditions and the
presence  of foreign firms,  who tend to follow higher standards (especially firms  from OECD
nations)  and  to  collaborate  effectively  with  local  labor  authorities.  There  are  exceptions,
however,  and these exceptions tend to be concentrated in low-skilled, labor-intensive assembly
operations with an elastic labor supply and lax government regulations and enforcement.  Thus,
conditions tend to be worst in garment and gem-cutting firms owned by locals and may be only
slightly better in those activities in joint ventures and foreign-owned firms.  In some countries,
OSH laws are outdated and do not adequately protect workers.  The frequency of accidents is
also related to average age of factories.  Finally,  information about true hazard rates is not often
well circulated within countries that have lax enforcement.  Accordingly, complaints about OSH
conditions are frequently lodged against nations in which OSH laws apply on paper to EPZs.  It
also seems that OSH conditions are more adequately revealed and compensated in EPZs in which
union rights are recognized.  Thus, to some extent the claim that FA rights provide a framework
for ensuring efficiency-enhancing  job practices is supported in EPZs.
3. Analysis of Labor Standards  and Trade
My purpose  in this  section is to  set out  a  series of hypotheses about trade  and  labor
standards and to  develop models that help clarify thinking about them. The primary analytical
focus  is  on  the  question  of  whether  and  how  deficient  CLS  affect  economic  competitive
advantage and trade.  For this purpose,  prevailing standards are taken as exogenous  to  each
model. Results are  summarized in the text, while the models themselves are presented in Annex
One.  The analysis is complementary to that in OECD (1996) and Brown, Deardorff, and Stern
(1996), but several additional points are addressed here.  Important among these are a treatment
of child labor use dealing with external costs,  an analysis of discrimination under constrained
markets,  and a  study of union rights  in a  distorted labor market.  Moreover,  I  consider the
effects of various policy proposals, which are not the focus of the other studies.
Before considering specific models, it is important to note briefly that labor standards are
endogenous outcomes of economic and political processes.  There is widespread agreement that
labor standards rise endogenously as income rises, along with some compelling evidence to that
effect.  10 There is room for research.  in this area because to date there are only simple correlations
that provide  little guidance (OECD,  1996).  Labor standards naturally vary  across countries,
depending on such factors as endowments, income growth and culture (Srinivasan, 1996).  In
this context, there seems little room for arguing for harmonized global standards, assuming that
'°Several  analysts  point  to the experience  in the East Asian  newly  industrializing  economies  of rising real wages
leading to improved bargaining  rights (with or without  fundamental  FA rights provided)  rapidly in the last two
decades. The case is not definitive  (World  Bank, 1995  and OECD, 1996), however,  Rama  (1995)  discovers  that an
aggregate  indicator  of labor-market  interventions  in Latin American  nations  rises with per-capita  GDP.  Careful
histories  of labor  legislation  in the United  States  and  Europe  would  likely  support  the same  conclusion.
13national standards reflect underlying social preferences.  Neither does the existence of varying
standards  alter  the  case  for  mutual  gains  from  free  trade  based  on  comparative  advantage
(Srinivasan, 1996; Stern, 1996; Bhagwati, 1995; Casella, 1995).
At the same time,  market distortions and political imperfections may interfere with the
standards-setting process (Maskus, 1996).  For example, limited CLS are possible as equilibrium
outcomes in distorted  economies.  In turn,  the imposition of CLS may or  may  not  improve
welfare and may not be the first-best approach (Bloom and Noor, 1994).  If the analysis goes on
to incorporate political-economy problems, it becomes easier to explain denial of CLS.  Models
based on rent-seeking behavior could support outcomes with monopsony employers protected by
limited product-market competition and deficient CLS on the input side.  Thus,  it seems that
political imperfections strongly raise the likelihood that CLS will not be adequately provided in
distorted economies.
I turn now to a series of theoretical models regarding core labor standards and trade.
While in each case, I remind the reader of the endogeneity of CLS, I treat them as exogenous
parameters  in the trade models.  These models are not exhaustive but  they do make  several
points about the role of deficient labor standards and point toward effective  policy solutions.
Results of the models are summarized in the text while the models are found in Annex One.
3.  a. Exploitation of Child Labor
Standards for protecting child workers, or minimum-age regulations, may be expected to
rise with  income levels and educational attainment.  They also should rise  as economies  shift
from agrarian societies to having a larger share of manufacturing in GDP, because manufacturing
activities tend to require greater labor skills.  This latter process strengthens as the manufacturing
sector shifts out of low-skill, labor-intensive production into more complicated activities.  Thus,
preferences for higher minimum educational attainment (and, therefore, minimum working ages)
expand with output mix and per-capita incomes.
San Martin (1996) demonstrates that labor-force participation rates by children aged 10-
14 decline significantly with GNP per capita.  Participation rates are also negatively correlated
with school enrollment rates, measured by  the percentage of children reaching 5t' grade across a
sample of 54 countries.  Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) review evidence strongly suggesting that,
among children aged 15 or younger, participation rates rise with age.  Boys are more likely to be
involved in market work and girls are more likely to be involved in home work.
There  is a  large literature  on the determinants of  child-labor supply,  as  reviewed  by
Grootaert  and  Kanbur  (1995).  Children enter  the market as  a  result of household  decisions
regarding  consumption,  fertility, and time allocation subject to  budget constraints. 1  In  this
IIGoldin (1979) and Horrell and Humphries (1995) find similar processes regarding child-labor use in the
United States and the United Kingdom during 19th-century industrialization.
14context, the most important influences on the amount of child labor include parents' educational
levels (especially the mother's),  parents'  income, and overall household income.  Particularly
important is the mother's  income.  A rise in the mother's income has both a substitution effect
(causing children, especially daughters, to perform more home work and attend less school) and
an income effect (freeing up resources to educate children).  The income effect may be expected
to dominate as household income grows, though there is little evidence about the level at which
this typically happens.  In Egypt, the cross-elasticity of supply of children with respect to female
employment ranges from  -1.5 to -3.0,  suggesting that higher female wages sharply reduce the
supply  of  young  workers  (Levy,  1985).  Also important  are  fertility decisions,  with  large
families tending to provide more child labor,
Viewed in the household context, the existence of child labor largely reflects poverty,  a
point on  which there  is wide agreement.  A related aspect is that poor  households may face
significant risks of  catastrophic declines in household income due  to poor  harvests  or  parent
layoffs  from  employment.  Accordingly,  there  is  a  valid  self-insurance strategy  implicit  in
encouraging children to work.
The quality of education available and its costs are further determinants of labor supply
for children.  San Martin (1996) shows that labor force participation rates among children aged
10-14 years rise with the primary-school student-teacher ratio across countries.  In some regions,
work  in  the  informal  sector  may  be  considered better  training  for  adulthood  than  school
attendance,  given the inadequacy of  schooling (Bonnet, 1993).  Regarding costs,  San Martin
(1996) cites studies that show that outlays for  books and a  school uniform for  one child can
command  as  much  as  one-third  of  a  family's  income,  providing  a  strong  disincentive  to
enrollments.  However,  there  seems to  be  a  positive and  elastic response  of enrollments to
reductions in schooling costs.
Thus, a critical determinant of child-labor use is household decisions to educate children.
In  Model  A. 1  in  Annex One,  I  develop a  simple model  of  schooling choice,  in  which  a
representative  household  maximizes  two-period utility  over  two  goods:  food,  which  has  a
minimum consumption requirement, and other goods.  If children go to school, which entails a
first-period cost, they receive a higher second-period wage, with the premium depending on the
productivity of education.  In the model, demand for education falls with a rise in the cost of
education and  an  increase in the minimum food consumption requirement.  It rises  with  the
productivity of education.  Demand also depends on the (uneducated) adult wage, the discount
rate, the stock of first-period children, and commodity prices.  An equilibrium Euler equation
generates an equality at the margin between the child-labor wage and the net return to education
less the cost of education.  While the model is simple, it points out that the most direct means of
raising incentives for attending school include raising current adult (parent) wage, reducing the
costs of education, and raising the productivity of education.
The  demand for  child labor  is,  in  the first  instance, derived from  product  demand.
Beyond this,  primary  determinants of child-labor demand  stem from  aspects of  labor-market
structure  (Grootaert  and  Kanbur,  1995).  Important  characteristics  include  substitution
15possibilities  between  child labor  and  adult labor,  monopsony hiring  practices,  the  length  of
apprenticeships, and segmentation between the informal and formal labor markets.  Regarding
the last factor, child employment is scarce in the formal sectors of any economy.  However,
economic  activity  in  the  formal  sector can  strongly  affect  child-labor demand  through  sub-
contracting of  assembly work to  households and  small enterprises  in the  informal  sector.
Finally,  technical change has strong  effects on the demand for child  labor to  the extent that
machines replace the need for small bodies and nimble fingers.
Some important implications of limitations on the use of child labor are worked out by
Brown, Deardorff,  and Stern (1996; BDS) and OECD (1996), though their focus lies more on
general effects of  mandated reductions in labor supply than on child employment.  They assume
that all workers are perfectly substitutable, that exports are labor-intensive in a Heckscher-Ohlin
framework, and that no distortions exist.  In this context,  a higher minimum working age would
have simple Rybczynski effects,  causing a  reduced trade volume at fixed international prices.
The interesting conclusion is that if the standard-adopting nation is large, the fall in trade volume
would improve its terms of trade and worsen the terms of trade of its trading partner.  BDS point
out  that  this  implies  we  should  observe  developing  (or  labor-abundant) countries  adopting
excessively  strong  CLS and  developed (or  labor-scarce) countries adopting excessively  weak
CLS, each measured relative to its own optimum without accounting for term-of-trade effects.
Accordingly, there may be  some need for international policy coordination, though the authors
do  not  advocate harmonization.  While this  result is  interesting and  potentially important,  it
surely  would  surprise  those  advocating the  adoption  of  stronger  labor  standards  in  poor
countries,  where  such standards are seen as inadequate, rather than excessive in  any  sense.
Proposals to levy tariffs against poor-country exporters do not evidently stem from a desire to
offset terms-of-trade losses associated with CLS in those countries.
BDS and OECD do not attempt to capture aspects of the exploitative use of child labor
specifically for output and trade.  I develop a simple model for this purpose. 2 In the literature,
the word "exploitative" is defined in numerous ways.  The analytical definition taken here is that
children  are  employed beyond  a  socially  optimum level,  where  the  social optimum  reflects
preferences for minimum-age standards. That is, the utility function incorporates tastes for child
safety and education.  I distinguish between private valuation for the working-age standard and
its social valuation.  The private  valuation does not  incorporate any social external effects of
inappropriate standards.  This idea relates to a negative externality: if children younger than the
market-determined age were prevented from working, social utility would rise.  One justification
for this view is that people suffer a psychic loss from exploitation of child labor but the market is
incapable of adequately revealing these losses and incorporating them into prices.  Another  is
that young children may be  forced by their families to work rather than to  remain in school.
Poor  families could choose  to  do  this in  order  to  maintain subsistence living  standards; the
essence of poverty  is an inability to  defer consumption in  order to  invest in human capital.
12The  model  is a component  of a general-equilibrium  specification  of child labor standards  in Maskus and
Holman (1996).
16However, a static externality arises to the extent that poorly educated young people make poorly
trained citizens.  A dynamic externality (unmodeled here) arises to the extent that the economy's
future income growth is retarded by inadequate schooling rates now.
Consider  a small open economy that produces an adult-labor-intensive exportable final
good X and  a  capital-intensive importable final good Y.  The country  also has a  non-traded
informal sector that produces  an input (N) into the X  sector.  This informal-sector output is
produced only by child labor.  Thus, the informal sector produces a service directly for use in
the export good.  This idea is meant to capture the phenomenon of sub-contracting by exporting
firms with enterprises in the informal (unregulated) sector.  Changes in demand for the export
good translate directly into changes in demand for child labor.
Let the supply of child labor into sector N be a rising function of the child wage, as in
Figure  1 below.  This assumes that the substitution effect of child wage changes dominates any
income effects.  If income effects dominated, a higher wage would induce children to opt for
more  leisure,  home  work,  and  education,  which  decision  would  be  made  in  a  household
optimizing framework, but I ignore that case here.'3 To capture the linkage between household
income and child-labor supply, I make this supply curve a negative function of the adult wage.
That is,  a higher adult wage induces parents to remove some of their children's  labor services
from the market in favor of schooling, as explained above.
The demand for child labor depends negatively on the wage and positively on output in
sector X.  A negative demand-side externality is depicted by placing curve D 0" below the market
demand curve D, with the difference between them reflecting the unpriced disutility costs from
child employment.  In this  context,  standards and  policies reducing exploitative child labor
practices are treated as a public good in that they appear identically in the utility functions of all
households (Stern, 1996).  In Figure 1, the marginal worker at market equilibrium point A is the
youngest worker, with other child workers (e.g.,  those below age 17) arranged from the origin
in descending order of age.  Because all child workers are substitutable, the youngest would have
the highest  reservation  wage because she  would have the highest opportunity cost  from  not
attending school.  This assignment of ages facilitates interpretation of policies.
This  discussion presumes that children removed from  the labor market  are no  longer
exploited (for example, they revert to the status of unpaid household members adopting leisure or
household work) or that they enter education for  longer periods of time.  In practical terms,
however,  these  positive outcomes  of  a  stronger  child  labor  standard are  not  assured  if  the
displaced children are forced into activities that are less desirable than producing an input for the
formal  sector.  Such activities could include living on the streets and  engaging in crime  and
prostitution.  More  simply, they might be  forced into other informal  activities that might  be
13A  backward-bending  child-labor  supply  curve would  raise the interesting  possibility  of multiple  stable
equilibria,  pointing  policy toward  trying to shift from a high-employment,  low-wage  equilibrium  to a low-
employment,  high-wage  equilibrium,  as discussed  in Basu  and Van (1996).
17subject to  even more abuse.  In this context,  it is conceivable that the externality is positive,
suggesting that a stronger labor standard would worsen social utility.
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Figure 1: Market for Child Labor
In Figure  1, the market equilibrium at point A generates excessive child employment in
the amount C0PC 0. A tax imposed on child labor use sufficient to reduce the demand curve to
DIP would achieve the social optimum at point D.  Note that this solution involves a lower wage
for  children who continue to  work,  because the private  valuation of child workers  at A had
exceeded the  social evaluation  (see point F).  Revenues from  this  tax could be  devoted  to
ensuring that the external benefits of removing the youngest workers actually ensue,  with  the
most obvious programs being educational assistance and enhanced schooling opportunities. Net
social gains from this first-best intervention would be the area DFA.
Taxing child labor use  in the informal sector may be  impossible.  A second approach
would be  simply to ban the use of child workers below age Cop, thereby erecting the vertical
B child-labor supply curve Sc . The difference between these policies is that now the wage of
B. remaining child workers would rise to w. , implying that a wedge remains between private and
social valuations of children workers at points E  and D.  A tax on these rents  would yield a
result equivalent to the direct tax above, though it is no more practical in this case.  A ban on
too-young employment in the informal sector may be equally unfeasible, though it depends on
the quality of inspection efforts.  Particularly important in this regard would be effective truancy
programs
18The difficulties in  enforcing  regulations in the informal sector suggest a  search for
alternative, though  indirect, policies.  In this  simple model,  three  possibilities arise.  First,
efforts  to  raise  adult  wages  should  reduce child-labor  supply,  with  the  extent  of  this  shift
dependent on the elasticity of supply with respect to adult incomes.  However, unless these are
lump-sum transfers to adults with young working children, numerous difficulties would arise in
implementation.  For example, subsidies to all adult workers would affect adult labor supply and
could distort output decisions.  Second, since demand for child labor is directly dependent on
output in the X sector in this model, the government could impose a tax on X output sufficient to
produce the desired reduction in derived labor demand in Figure  1.  The difficulty here is that
the tax would impose a secondary distortion through altering the producer price of X.
A third possibility is that the rest of the world (ROW) could act to influence child-labor
demand.  Much of the controversy over labor standards surrounds the fact that individuals in
wealthy  countries might be negatively affected by limited labor standards in poor countries.  The
model provides  a  consistent  way of  incorporating one  such  spillover.  Suppose that  ROW
considers the country's minimum-age standards  to be deficient.  That is, ROW's utility function
also exhibits tastes for  reducing child labor use in its trading partner.  In Figure 1, I assume that
ROW  has  stronger  preferences  to  do  so than does  the country  itself,  so that  from  ROW's
standpoint the appropriate demand curve is DR.
Two ROW policies could be considered: an import tariff on X and a lump-sum tax that
ROW levies on itself for purposes of compensating the country to remove underage workers.  A
tariff calibrated to reduce X exports sufficiently to shift labor demand to D 0p would result in the
appropriate level of child employment, from the exporting nation's viewpoint, but would impose
standard efficiency costs from the tariff and worsen the country's terms of trade.  A larger tariff
to  achieve demand curve  DR would exacerbate these problems in  addition to  reducing  child
employment excessively and further lowering the wage of children workers.  Thus, remaining
child laborers bear a portion of the burden of ROW's tariff.  This solution is not optimal from
the exporter's  standpoint since it maintains a  wedge between private and  social valuations of
child workers, generates no tax revenues, and imposes efficiency losses from the tariff. There is
a utility gain to ROW from  reducing child employment, but ROW has not paid for the utility
gain.
A  global  social planner  would  instruct  ROW to  pay  compensation for  inducing  the
exporter  to  select  an  excessive  labor  standard.  In  principle,  this  could  be  achieved  by
transferring  the tariff  revenues  (or,  equivalently, convincing the  poor  country to  impose an
export tax on X). However, trade taxes are inefficient means of accomplishing social goals of
this type.  A less distortionary means would be for ROW to transfer revenues from its general
budget.  Since this policy is not a trade tax,  it would not necessarily affect demand for X, and
therefore for child labor, in the exporter.  Rather, it would be paid to induce the latter to adopt a
higher minimum working age.
One important linkage that is missing from this partial-equilibrium model is that changes
in the child-labor market affect adult-labor wages, which feed back into the child-labor supply.
19Sector X, which is adult-labor-intensive, is the only user of good N.  In general equilibrium, a
rise  in the cost of the intermediate input reduces X output and lowers the real  wage of adult
laborers. 14  In turn, there would be some increase in the child-labor supply curve, to some extent
offsetting the impacts of a tax or ban on child labor.  Note that a ROW tariff on X would directly
reduce the  adult wage  through Stolper-Samuelson effects,  also expanding child labor  supply,
though the reduction in child wage would mitigate the tariff's  effect somewhat through a lower
intermediate price.  Such effects, governed by the elasticity of child-labor supply with respect to
the  adult wage,  are  crucial in  calculating various policy  approaches.  With  a  highly  elastic
response, for example, it is conceivable that net child employment would rise after a ROW tariff
is imposed.
The simple theory presented here generates the results listed in Table 2, which presents
qualitative predictions for key variables in cases where the export good, X, intensively uses the
intermediate input produced by child labor, as discussed above.  It also considers cases where the
import good, Y, does so.  If the latter situation holds, the ROW tariff could actually raise child
employment by pushing resources into the Y sector.  While this may seem unlikely, it does point
to the need for careful assessment of the inter-industry structure of employment linkages.  The
rows marked "ROW Compensation" assume that the rest of the world pays the exporter to adopt
a higher minimum working age.
The analysis suggests that international compensation is, in principle, an effective route to
reducing child labor employment in line with tastes in developed countries.  However, a major
difficulty lies in the external nature of the benefits of higher labor standards.  Consumers in both
the exporter  and ROW  are liable to  free ride on  these gains,  suggesting that  revealing their
preferences  for higher  standards could be  problematic.  Thus,  extracting  these compensatory
taxes could be  impossible.  Moreover,  costless transfer of the payments may not be possible;
political failures and transactions costs in both countries could inefficiently absorb some or all of
the revenues, with little impact on labor demands.
14 This is easily seen  with the use of value-added  isoquants  in goods  X and Y; in fact all that matters for this
result is that X intensively  uses N relative  to Y.
20Table 2.  Impacts of Policies to Correct Inadequate Minimum-Age Standards
Panel A: Good X is N-intensive
Policy  Externality  Child Empl.  Child Wage  Adult Wage  Exports
Tax on Child Labor  Corrects  Lower  Lower  Lower  Lower
Higher Minimum Age  Corrects  Lower  Higher  Lower  Lower
Tax on Intermediate  Corrects  Lower  Lower  Lower  Lower
ROW Tariff  Overcorrects  Lower  Lower  Lower  Lower
ROW Compensation  Corrects  Lower  Higher  Lower  Lower
Panel B: Good Y is N-intensive
Policy  Externality  Child Empl.  Child Wage  Adult Wage  Exports
Tax on Child Labor  Corrects  Lower  Lower  Higher  Higher
Higher Minimum Age  Corrects  Lower  Higher  Higher  Higher
Tax on Intermediate  Corrects  Lower  Lower  Higher  Higher
ROW Tariff  Does not  Higher  Higher  Lower  Lower
correct
ROW Compensation  Corrects  Lower  Higher  Higher  Higher
Such difficulties  call  for  developing mechanisms that  can be  more  directly  aimed  at
efficient compensation and preference revelation.  Among these might be:
1.  Product-labeling  schemes.  Providing  information  on  the  production  process
(including use of child labor) in products helps reveal information to consumers.  If they
value higher  standards they should be  willing to  pay  some price  for  this  information
(through higher product prices),  which  should in  principle be  higher than the  cost of
providing the information.  The excess could be used to promote training and education
programs.  However, there are conceptual difficulties with this approach, which I discuss
again later.
2.  Targeted educational programs.  Since the utility spillover discussed above relies on
the  belief  in ROW  that  child workers will  gain from  being removed from  the labor
market,  it  seems  incumbent  that  these  alternatives  actually  are  made  better.
21Compensation payments aimed at improving schools and broadening school access are
appealing.
3.  Poverty  alleviation.  The decision of  parents to  allow children  to  work  largely
reflects the essential contribution of children wages or effort to family income.  A direct
means of inducing decisions to keep children in school (and out of the workforce) longer
is  to  increase  parent  incomes through  poverty  reduction  programs  and  employment
creation.
Practical  mechanisms for  implementing these approaches are  not  always  straightforward  and
effective. At this point I note the strong conclusion that the most effective way  to reducing child
labor  problems  is  to  improve  educational access and  the  effectiveness of  education.  Most
particularly,  impoverished countries could be urged to develop primary educational systems and
provide more schooling opportunities,  through  some articulated minimum school-leaving age
that is monitored by a truancy system.  To avoid imposing additional  costs on families, school
fees  and book  charges might be  reduced or  subsidized and  compensation  might  be  enacted
through direct payments .
Some  observers  might  object  to  the  notion  of  pinning  the  need  for  government
intervention to  the existence of a  demand-side externality.  An  alternative source  of  market
failure  in  poor  countries  is the  inability of capital markets to  provide  short-term  finance  to
impoverished families in the event of falling income, forcing them to place their children into
work  for  the  self-insurance  motive  discussed  earlier.  1
5 In  terms  of  Figure  1,  ignore  the
externality but imagine that the supply of child labor depends negatively on the depth of capital
markets.  As financial markets deepen, the supply of children shrinks and,  in this case,  it is
likely that children withdrawing from the workplace attend school.  This  interpretation of the
child-labor problem points toward government efforts to improve access to short-term borrowing
for poor households.  Another interpretation is that there is a  failure in the education market
related to inadequate and high-cost schooling, making the private return to education lower than
the social return (Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995).  In this case the market supply curve is again too
far to the right.  The first-best policy in this case is to improve the quality of schools and raise
access to education.
These  ideas come through  in other models of child-labor use  as well.  For  example,
Melchior (1996) presents a simple model in which children are a specific factor in a  low-skill
export sector, capital is specific in a high-skill import sector,  and adult labor is mobile between
them.  Comparative statics in the model rest on the assumption of specific factors.  For example,
a partial ban on child labor removes some of  them from the workplace, generating less output in
the export sector, more output in the import sector, and a higher wage for remaining children
workers.  A foreign tariff reduces demand for children workers, though he argues that because a
tariff does not discriminate between firms that use child workers and those that do not,  it is a
5 I am grateful  to Ann  Harrison  for pointing  this  out.
22blunt and potentially ineffective instrument.  He argues also for raising consumer information
through product-labeling schemes.
3.b.  Discrimination
Labor-market  discrimination  can  be  based  either  on  limited  wages  or  restricted
employment, or both,  of workers on a basis other than productivity.  Labor economists view
discrimination as sustainable in equilibrium in competitive markets because it arises in the utility
functions of employers.  Employers are willing to  sacrifice some profit in order  to meet their
demand to discriminate.  16  In equilibrium the loss in profits just offsets the gain in psychic utility
from discriminating.  A related  notion is that fellow workers feel disutility (are prejudiced) if
they are asked to work with members of a particular group.  Such feelings affect cost functions
and result  in lower  wages for the disliked group unless  employers succeed in establishing  a
segregated workplace.
Because tastes for discrimination are given in utility functions, economists tend to ignore
the sources of these tastes for prejudice and focus on their effects on employment, wages, and
output  (Cain,  1986).  Economists  also  can  point  out  least-cost  approaches  to  reducing
discrimination.  However,  because discrimination  is thought to  be  widespread in  developing
countries, particularly against female workers,  it is worth briefly discussing its source.  A full
treatment would require  an extensive sociological analysis.  It is conceivable that cultural and
religious customs generate a preference to discourage women from entering work , to pay them
less for equal or comparable work, and to segregate men and women.  This situation leads to
economic discrimination in Becker's sense, though some would  dispute the cultural meaning of
the term.
Perhaps more likely is the existence of  "statistical discrimination,"  (Thurow,  1975) in
which there is no intent to discriminate but employers perceive that female workers have lower
expected productivity than men  because of  different  group characteristics.  For  example,  if
traditions  of work  suggest that  women  are more  likely to  leave employment than  men,  the
perceived marginal product of women could be  less than true marginal product for particular
females.  This possibility seems particularly relevant for poor countries with substantial entry of
women into the workplace occurring only recently.
Both sources of discrimination result in reduced demand for female workers that can be
sustained in competitive markets until  social mores and work traditions change or until more
precise signaling mechanisms become available in labor markets.  Again,  it is clear that to  an
important  degree  standards  for  protection  from  discrimination  are  endogenous  to  economic
development, work needs in the labor market, changing output mixes, and educational attainment
of women.
6Oaxaca  and Ransom  (1994), Cain (1986),  and Becker  (1971).
23Discrimination in Competitive Markets
Here I discuss some simple, partial-equilibrium models of the competitiveness effects of
discrimination  against women.  Suppose first that  labor markets are  competitive and  there is
sectoral wage discrimination.  In Figure 2, consider the market for female labor (or any group
experiencing discrimination) in a particular industry, which is initially in equilibrium at wage w*.
Assume that the government mandates discrimination against women or that employers prefer to
do so by setting a maximum wage of w'.  This wage is below the market-determined wage and
below the marginal value product of  female workers.  A simple analysis that focused solely on
the  demand  side  might conclude that  employment and  output (and  hence competitiveness  in
product and export markets)
Figure 2.  Implications of Discrimination Against  Female Labor
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would  rise,  generating  employment of  females  at  qd.  However,  in  such  a  disequilibrium
situation,  the short  side of  the market  determines employment.  Here,  the market  would be
supply-constrained because some women are forced out by the lower wage.  The distance q5qd
becomes  excess  demand  for  female labor.  In  this  simple case,  employment,  output,  and
competitiveness would all fall, rather than rise, in the affected sector.
If there were another, unregulated sector in the economy, the labor forced out of the first
market would flow into the unregulated sector, driving down female wages there.  In equilibrium
the latter wage must be driven to w' or less in order for the original sector to retain any of the
employees being discriminated against.  If this condition is satisfied, the resulting outcome will
be stable, indicating that sectoral wage discrimnination  against women in the primary market will
reduce female wages generally and increase output and competitiveness in the residual sector.
This final outcome is different from the concern that appears to have motivated worries  about
export competitiveness through wage discrimination. The intersectoral mobility of labor would
24also tend to raise the male wage in relation to its prior level.  This is evident if there are two
factors (male and female labor) and fixed output prices in a small open economy.
The  discrimination represented  in  Figure  2 can be  generated by  employer prejudices
against women,  with the margin of discrimination (w*  - w)  determined by the least-prejudiced
employer under  constant costs.'7 In  the long  run,  however,  it  is  inconsistent with  rational
behavior by employers.  Thus, unless tastes for discrimination remain unabated in employers'
utility functions, it would  be profitable for them to pay more than the discriminatory wage rate
to  secure the services of an  additional worker,  whose marginal product is above w'.  In  this
context, such tastes might be expected to diminish because of this profit incentive or we might
expect to see entry of entrepreneurs with less prejudice.  If the discrimination is associated with
poor  information  about productivity of  employees,  incentives should emerge  to  improve the
accuracy  of  such  information.  One  conclusion  is  that  governmental  efforts  to  reduce
discrimination should raise market efficiency.
Considering trade,  export volume falls if the discrimination is in the exportable sector
but import volume rises if it is in the importable sector.  In  Figure  2,  suppose  the  industry
depicted is the exporter and the residual sector competes with imports.  A tariff lodged by ROW
in protest would shift down the demand for female labor in the exportable.  This would have no
effect  on women  if  the discrimination is  stated in terms  of a  fixed wage  (unless the  falling
demand  renders  the  constraint  nonbinding  and  wage  falls)  but  would  harm  women  if
discrimination involves  a fixed wedge below the true demand curve. If discrimination lies in the
import-competing good,  the ROW tariff on exports  would reduce  demand for  women  in  the
(residual) exportable sector, tending to reduce female wage in both goods below its constrained
level. In this model, then, a foreign tariff could not help women and could harm their position,
unless it induced some reduction  in legislated or preferred discrimination. 8
The prior model assumed a fixed supply of female workers in the economy.  If female
labor  supply  has  positive elasticity,  however,  economy-wide discrimination would  affect the
production frontier.  Here I describe results from a two-sector general-equilibrium model that is
provided in Annex One (Model A.2).  Suppose that both (all)  sectors of the economy agree to
offer  a wage below the non-discriminatory equilibrium to women.  This would be the case if
there  is  national government-mandated discrimination or  uniform preferences  to  discriminate
across all firms.  The effect would be to reduce aggregate employment of women, shifting in the
production frontier,  with the displaced women being forced into home work or leisure.  This
shift would tend to reduce output in the female-labor-intensive sector (say X) and to raise output
in the male-labor-intensive sector (Y).  The result is reinforced by the relative increase in the
17Cain  (1986)  discusses  this condition,  which  depends  on competition,  free entry, and constant  costs.  The
discrimination  margin is different  from the "exploitation  margin," which  would  be the proportional  difference
between  the discrimnination  wage and female  workers' true marginal  value product.
18 These results  come from the partial-equilibrium  model. In general  equilibrium  the effects would  depend  on
the female-labor  intensity  of the exportable  versus the importable. In the case that seems  to dominate
competitiveness  concerns, with the exportable  being female-worker  intensive  and the locus of discrimination,  a
foreign tariff would raise male wages but have either no effect or a depressive effect on female wages.
25male wage (given fixed output prices), inducing a movement along the reduced frontier toward
sector Y.1 9 Thus, the distorted equilibrium involves reduced production of the good that makes
intensive use of  the discriminated-against factor.  If this  is the export sector the economy's
export competitiveness is impaired.  If it is the import-competing sector there would be a larger
trade  volume.  In  any  case  the  conclusion  holds  that  discrimination  interferes  with  the
competitive operation of the economy.  Again, unless tastes for discrimination firmly remain in
employers' utility functions, incentives should emerge over time to undo the discrimination since
the marginal value product of female workers is above wage in both sectors.  We might observe
firms paying non-pecuniary benefits as a result.
Some  additional  comments are  worth making.  Here,  the  effect  of  discrimination  is
clearly  not  to  create  competitive advantage  in  exports,  rather  it  has  the  opposite  effect.
However, if sector X were intensive in male labor, the effect would have been reversed, with its
production rising along the lower production frontier.  In this case, export volume might be
larger than in the unconstrained case, though the discrimination is still costly and inefficient.
Regarding international prices, because discrimination in our main example reduces the home
country's  trade offer, it would get a terms-of-trade gain if it were a large country.  This means
that  eliminating the  discrimination  (thereby expanding exports)  would  cut  its  export  price,
transferring  some  of  the  gains to  ROW  (the opposite would pertain  if  X  were  male-labor-
intensive).  This outcome is just opposite to the main conclusion in Brown, Deardorff, and Stern
(1996), because here the labor standard increases the supply of labor rather than reduces it.
Would a  tariff imposed by  ROW on this  country's  exports  help or  harm  the women
discriminated against?  In the case where exports are intensive in female labor, they would be
harmed by reducing wages even further and exacerbating the output effects.  In the case where
exports  are intensive in  male labor,  the tariff would raise demand for  female labor,  causing
female wages to place upward pressure on the female maximum wage.  In this case, firms might
prefer to relax the discrimination to some degree.
Now  consider  employment  discrimination,  or  setting  a  binding  maximum  level  of
employment of some group.  If there is such discrimination against female (or child or ethnic)
workers in competitive markets it operates through a decline in aggregate demand for that factor
and  has  identical  effects  to  the  economy-wide wage  discrimination  case  analyzed  above,
including a lower female wage.  Overall, the country would sacrifice real income because of the
restriction, unless some terms-of-trade gain is sufficient to overcome the efficiency loss (though
using discrimination to enforce export-price changes is inefficient compared to an export tax).
One  difference  in  the  models,  however,  is that  now  the  quantity of  female employment  is
constrained, rather than the female wage.  A ROW tariff harms women if exports are intensive in
female labor but helps them if exports are intensive in male labor.
'9  This assumes  that sector Y can absorb  the additional  male labor and that the new female-labor  equilibrium
remains at the lower wage (so that there was initially an even larger fall in the female wage).  Such an equilibrium
may not be assured for some technologies.
26Similarly, if employment discrimination occurs only in one sector it will have identical
effects to sectoral wage discrimination except for the nature of the constraint.  In Figure 2 above,
imagine that the female labor-demand curve becomes vertical at employment level q5, reducing
the  wage to  w.  Output  rises  in the residual  sector while women's  wage  is reduced  in both
sectors.  The general-equilibrium model for this case is presented in Annex One (Model A.3).
An important insight from that model is that, if the discrimination lies in the export sector, there
is a reduction in export volume both due to the inefficiency caused and substitution along the
shrunken-in production frontier.
Here  a  ROW  tariff  could  harm women  if  the  discrimination is  in  the  export  sector
because it could lower demand for female labor below the constraint and reduce wage further.  If
discrimination lies in the importable good, the ROW tariff would reduce demand for women in
export (residual) sector , reducing wages of all women.
Before  continuing  it  should be  noted that,  from  the  home country's  standpoint,  the
optimal policy  intervention in each case is to remove the discrimination.  Interest arises here,
however,  in  whether  a  tariff  imposed  by  ROW  will  help  or  harm  the  female  workers
discriminated against as I have discussed in each case.  It should also be kept in mind that the
ROW tariff policy is an indirect approach to the problem, even in those cases in which it extends
pressure for change in the correct direction,  In any event, collecting the results of this section
generates  Table  3.  The relevant technical factors  include whether  exports  are  female-labor
intensive and the female labor-supply elasticity. 20
It  might  be  argued  that  the  ROW  tariff  would  increase  incentives  to  remove
discrimination.  In cases where the tariff reduces the demand for female labor, it actually relaxes
wage pressure  on the discrimination constraint at the margin,  making it easier to  sustain the
discrimination.  However,  if subsequent tariff removal were tied to abolition of discrimination,
export interests could be expected to work for such abolition to the extent that expected export
gains outweigh expected increases in labor costs.  How effective such lobbying would be, either
in  eliminating  government-mandated  discrimination  or  in  inducing  importable  sectors  to
overcome preferred discrimination, would depend on a variety of economic and political factors.
20 Also relevant would  be the mobility  of male and female  labor and capital. It is possible  to analyze
discrimination  with sector-specific  female  labor  forces, for example,  though  the main difference  would  be that
discrimination  would  effect a rent transfer from women  to men or capital.
27Table 3.  The Impacts of Discrimination in Competitive  Labor Markets
Causes  Effect on  Effect on
ROW Tariff Effect on those
Type  Inefficiency  Exports  Export Pricea  Discrimilnated  Againsth
General Wage  Yes  Lower if exports  Higher  Harms
or Employment;  are F-intensive
Elastic Labor Supply
Higlher  if exports  Lower  Helps
are M-intensive
Sectoral Wage  Yes  Lower if discriminate  Higher  No effect or harms
or Employment;  in exportable
Fixed Labor Supply
Higher if discriminate  Lower  Harms
in importable
Notes: aAssumes  home countiy is a large exporter; bConditional  upon the discrimination being maintained.
Discrimination  in Imperfectly  Competitive  Markets
The  likelihood  of  persistent  discrimination  is higher  in imperfectly  competitive  output  and
labor  markets  (Cain,  1986).  A  monopolist  in the  product  market  earns  above-competitive  profits
with  which  it can  indulge  its  preference  for  discrimination  or  the  tastes  of  majority  groups  among
its  workforce  for  workplace  segregation.  It  may  choose  not  to  discriminate,  in  that  segregating
or  compartmentalizing  its  workforce  by  group  minimizes  costs  if  segregation  is feasible  and  low-
cost.  A  choice  to  discriminate  does  not  maximize  profits,  however,  so  engaging  in  it might  leave
the  monopolist  vulnerable  to  takeovers  by  investors  with  less  prejudice.  Thus,  the  existence  of
discrimination  in  a  monopoly  relies  on  imperfections  in  the  capital  market.  Government
restrictions  against  takeovers  are  one  source  of  such  imperfections,  with  regulated  monopolies
and  state-owned  enterprises  providing  an  extreme  example  of  particular  relevance  in  many  poor
countries.  These  firms  do  not  face  takeover  threats  nor  must  they  strive  to  maximize  profits.
Accordingly,  freeing  up  capital  markets  and  introducing  further  product-market  competition  are
likely  to  be  effective  second-best  approaches  to reducing  discrimination.
A  more  likely  source  of  persistent  discrimination  is  imperfectly  competitive  labor
markets.  As  shown  in  the  next  section,  a  monopsony  employer  (or  collusive  set  of  employers)
maximizes  profits  by  hiring  at  a  level  where  labor's  value  marginal  product  lies  above  its  wage,
which  is the  neoclassical  definition  of  exploitation.  The  markup  over  wage  is  higher  the  more
inelastic  is  labor  supply.  It  follows  that  if  one  group  has  a  more  inelastic  labor  supply  than
another,  the  first  will  suffer  more  exploitation  (higher  markup)  and  discrimination  (a  lower
wage)  for  identical  levels  of  productivity,  assuming  they  are  not  otherwise  homogeneous  factors
28(Madden,  1973).  It is debatable whether the latter outcome should be labeled "discrimination"
since it does not rely on a taste for prejudice, though the label is accepted by labor economists.
There could also be true discrimination in such markets since the monopsony profits support it.
Monopsony employment is most likely to exist in localized labor markets and where workers are
immobile  and  have  little  information  about  alternative  employment  opportunities  in  other
regions.  These  situations  characterize  the  rural  areas  of  most  developing  economies.
Monopsony may also be relevant in those EPZs where there are only a few employers.
Labor unions are often cited as a source of persistent discrimination (Cain, 1986).  Strong
collective bargaining rights provide majority workers the ability to enforce both higher wages for
themselves and their tastes for exclusion through discrimination.  This outcome requires some
entry restriction against minority workers.  Entry limitations are more easily sustained among
homogeneous  majority  membership  groups.  One  implication  is  that  introducing  strong
bargaining rights  into an economy bears some potential for worsening discrimination that may
exist for other reasons.
The issue here is whether discrimination is harmful or helpful, in efficiency terms, when
labor markets are not  competitive.  Because discrimination is a  form of market  distortion,  it
should come as little surprise that in a second-best framework the introduction of discrimination
could actually unravel some inefficiency effects of other distortions.  Consider one example: let
there be two sectors, X and Y, each with a monopsonistic labor employer.  (I discuss monopsony
further below  in the context of no discrimination.)  Let there  be  four differentiated  factors,
female workers in each sector and male workers in each sector, each with differential elasticities
of labor supply (allowing for labor-leisure tradeoffs).  The monopsonists will set employment
levels to establish profit-maximizing markups of marginal hiring costs over wages,  so that all
workers  are  paid  below  their  marginal  revenue  products.  Without  yet  worrying  about
discrimination, it follows that the economy suffers efficiency losses as a result.
The  effect  of  discrimination  would  be  to  set  lower  maximum  wages  or  maximum
employment levels for women in either or both sectors.  Both policies would make worse the
monopsony distortion with respect to female labor, however,  firms would also hire more male
labor,  reducing the monopsony distortion  in that  factor.  The discrimination could have the
impact of  lowering net efficiency losses in the economy.  Impacts on trade  volumes and the
effectiveness of ROW tariffs would depend on which commodity is exported and the extent of
monopsony distortions by  sector  and factor,  which would be  dependent on  female and  male
labor-supply elasticities.  It is certainly not clear that discrimination provides an effective export
subsidy,  as  is  sometimes  alleged.  "Social  dumping"  duties  that  fail  to  recognize  these
complexities could make female workers worse off.
That  being  said,  it is clear  that  the  source  of the  difficulty is  the joint  existence of
monopsony and discrimination.  In otherwise competitive markets, the first-best approach is to
remove both  distortions.  I  do not  take seriously the claim that countries  can or  should use
discrimination  to  offset  other  market  distortions,  nor  that  discrimination  should  be  allowed
because it may have that effect endogenously.  Accordingly, I do not consider it further here.
293. c. Freedom of Association and Collective  Bargaining
Consider  next the  issue of providing rights  for  freedom of  association and  collective
bargaining.  There are cases in which the existence of market distortions,  such as monopsony
employers, informational asymmetries, and political failure can support the introduction of FA
rights.
FA Rights in Undistorted Economies
The main problem in analyzing the efficiency impacts of FA rights is that it is not clear
how  those  rights  will  be  utilized.  Workers  form  an  association  of  labor  for  purposes  of
collectively advancing their interests. The literature is not clear on what labor unions attempt to
do and how they attempt to do it.  There is a large literature on the preferences of labor unions
(Farber,  1986),  analyzing (always  in  a  closed-economy context  and nearly  always  in  partial
equilibrium)  several possible  choices unions could  make.  These choices  include  setting  an
aggregate or  sectoral  minimum wage,  setting minimum employment guarantees,  negotiating
employment security rights for designated workers based on seniority or  other characteristics,
setting pension standards, working hours, grievance procedures, and so on.  It is  not feasible to
analyze many of these choices.
I focus on wage setting.  Consider first a national labor union setting an economy-wide
mninimum  wage, which might capture the phenomenon of national wage bargaining tied to public-
sector wages in developing economies.  This policy of a generalized minimum wage has been
analyzed by Brecher (1974a, 1974b). The details are complicated, so I provide a summary.
The primary  impact of  the general  minimum wage  (set  in  terms of  some  numeraire
commodity or price  index) is to create aggregate unemployment by raising the cost  of  labor,
which reduces the economy's production possibilities.  Although it is not assured, one expected
effect is a reallocation of employed labor and capital to the labor-intensive sector.  Indeed, over a
range  of  relative  prices  the  model  predicts  complete specialization  in  that  good,  although
complete specialization does not  necessarily imply a  higher output of X than  in the  original
equilibrium because of the limited production frontier subject to the wage constraint.  The impact
on trade volumes is ambiguous, though  trade is likely to fall as the minimum wage is raised
above the market wage.  Accordingly, if exports are the labor-intensive good the economy could
experience reduced exports and a gain on its terms of trade akin to those listed in Table 3.
To summarize, the introduction of FA rights that sets an aggregate minimum real wage
has the effects of raising unemployment, reducing economic efficiency and probably lowering
exports. Note, therefore, that a ROW tariff that induces the introduction or  strengthening of  FA
rights would also work in these directions.  The direct effect of a tariff imposed on an economy
without FA  rights  (minimum wage) would simply be  to reduce efficiency and income  of the
exporter.
30A more likely outcome  of FA rights is to set an above-market minimum in a particular
sector.  This framework is called the Harris-Todaro (1970) model, which has been extensively
analyzed in the trade literature, with the most commonly cited papers being Corden and Findlay
(1975) and Calvo (1978).  Imagine that a sector-specific minimum wage is set in the import good
Y.  This higher wage is sustained by limited entry into the labor union from workers in sector X.
The wage in X is, in equilibrium, equal to the expected wage in sector Y.  The labor endowment
is split into employment in Y, in X, and unemployment, which arises from workers leaving the
X sector but being unable to  find jobs  in the Y sector.  The unemployment again reduces the
economy's production possibilities.  Output effects are ambiguous: both could fall or one could
rise and the other could fall.  It  is likely that output in the Y sector diminishes because of the
artificially high labor cost there, but this depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor (Corden and Findlay, 1975). The economic inefficiency would be removed optimally
by limiting union rights.  Alternative policies, such as wage subsidies to the unionized sector,
may be  relatively ineffective because the union  is an actor in  the process and  could alter  its
behavior if it is acting as a monopoly labor supplier.  The ambiguity in output responses makes
trade-volume effects also ambiguous, although the inefficiency again points toward the likelihood
of lower trade offers.  Note that if the export sector is not unionized a ROW tariff would reduce
demand for labor in that sector, causing greater unemployment.
FA Rights in  Distorted Economies
It  is  no  surprise  that  union  rights  lower  economic  efficiency  in  otherwise  efficient
markets.  Such has been  the thrust  of  trade  theorists'  analysis of  labor unions in  the  open
economy.  Labor economists have devoted more attention to the question of whether unions can
increase  efficiency and  under  what  conditions.  Second-best theory  indicates that  introducing
labor unions  into otherwise distorted  markets may raise or  lower  income, depending on  the
circumstances.  I  focus  on  the  case  in  which  employers  have  monopsony  power  in  hiring
workers.  21
Consider first the simple, partial-equilibrium analysis of monopsony, in which a  single
firm,  or  a  small set  of collusive firms,  has  market power  in the labor market.  That is,  its
decisions on hiring levels affect wages.  Monopsony could be natural in a small market in which
there are a limited number of firms in equilibrium, or  it could be supported by governmental
barriers to entry of other employers in the labor markets. Thus, it should exist more commonly
in  small  nations,  or  in  regional  labor  markets  within  larger  nations,  or  in  countries  with
significant protection from domestic competition for workers.  Monopsony could also arise if the
national or local government decides to limit entry and exit of workers from a particular regional
labor market and  also requires natural or legislated limitations on international labor migration.
In Figure  3 I depict  a  closed-economy, partial-equilibrium monopsony diagram.  The
monopsonist's labor demand curve is DL and it faces a labor-supply curve SL.  If employers were
21  Maskus,  Rutherford,  and  Selby  (1996)  analyze  the  case  in which  employers  fail  to divulge  information  to
workers  about  risk  characteristics  of employment.
31competitive in  this labor market,  employment would be  at A with  wage rate wo.  However,
because the firm is a single employer it gains an inframarginal reduction in wage for all workers
whenever it cuts hiring, generating a marginal-cost curve for labor that lies above SL.  The firm
maximizes profits by setting labor marginal costs equal to its labor-demand curve at point B.
This reduction in hiring results in employment level L1, wage rate w, and labor marginal cost of
MC1. The markup of marginal cost over wage obeys this relationship:
MC/w=  1 +  1/11L
where  1 nL  is the  labor-supply elasticity.  The more  inelastic is labor supply the greater  the
markup.  Thus, for a fixed output price and capital stock, the monopsonist reduces employment
below  the economically efficient point.  The effect  is  that workers  are  paid  less  than their
marginal  revenue  products,  which  violates a  fundamental efficiency condition.  The  standard
measure of this inefficiency cost is the triangle ABC.  The optimal policy response is either to
increase competition in the demand for labor or to subsidize employment in this sector.
An alternative approach is to  allow workers to organize a union  and bargain with the
firm(s).  The outcome of such bargaining depends on the union's  objective with respect to the
22 given labor-demand curve.  In principle, the union could bargain for the solution at point A,
thereby  replicating  the  competitive  equilibrium.  In  this  case  the  union  would  clearly  be
efficiency-enhancing, indeed it would restore Pareto efficiency.  More likely, however, the union
will  restrict  employment levels in  an effort to  raise the  wage.  If  the union  chose  simply to
maintain  employment at  level L1 but  to bargain  over  a higher wage,  the wage  could be  set
anywhere between w,  and MC1,  depending on relative bargaining strength of the firm and the
union.  This outcome would decide  the split of the rents  in the labor market but  would not
improve  efficiency.  If  the union  sets  a  higher  employment  level,  and  therefore  a  lower
maximum wage, economic inefficiency will be reduced.
However,  if the union  sets a lower employment level,  as it could do by establishing a
closed shop limited to those with a particular level of seniority,  it would raise the wage and
increase inefficiency. This would be the rent-maximizing strategy in Figure  3 if the union had
complete bargaining leverage.  In Figure 3 the union becomes a monopoly labor supplier relative
to  the  labor-demand curve.  Its  rent-maximizing choice  is to  set  the marginal revenue  from
cutting employment (MRL) equal to  its own labor-supply curve at D,  limiting employment to
L2.23  This  ambiguity in  this  situation is  called  bilateral monopoly in  the  labor-economics
literature and evidently does not have any generalized solution.
22It also depends  on the firm's response  in a game-theoretic  setting, since  both the firm and the union are now
active  players. This  is a massive  literature  that I do not further  review  here.
23It  is misleading  to think  of a labor-supply  curve existing  in this case, except  as a construct  helping  to determine
optimal  supply  restrictions.
32A brief note is in order on the rents available to the monopsony firm and the labor union.
These rents could also be shared with government actors to the extent that hiring limitations are
supported  by  government  regulations  and  there  is  rent  seeking.  Rent  seeking  should  be
considered an efficiency loss, however it is impossible to know (except by case-by-case analysis)
whether the problem is likely to be worse under monopsony or some combination of monopsony
and union bargaining.
To  summarize the analysis in a  closed economy, under  monopsony the wage  paid is
lower than the free-market wage, but this does not result in higher employment levels.  Rather,
the level of employment in the industry is below what it would be in a competitive market.  In
the product market, the output and output share of the industry must be lower than in the absence
of
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monopsony.  Moving from the partial-equilibrium model to the economy as a whole, the workers
displaced by monopsony hiring practices must move into unemployment (informal sector) or inito
other sectors, driving down wage rates there.  It is in these sectors, rather than in the industry
where  wages are directly depressed,  that output will increase and the industry becomes more
competitive.
Concerns are often expressed about the absence of FA rights in export sectors leading to
greater export competitiveness.  Thus, I turn to the case of monopsony in an open economy.  I
limit the presentation here to an economy in which the monopsony exists in the export sector,
which  is  labor- intensive,  but  there are many possibilities.  Consider first  that  a  small open
33economy that exports  labor services through trade  implicitly faces a perfectly elastic external
24 demand for its labor.  This is because product arbitrage generates home factor prices equal to
foreign factor prices  (net of any tariffs and  transport costs),  which  are fixed in  international
markets.  A monopsonist  drives a wedge between foreign and domestic wage through limiting
employment in a localized labor market, even at the fixed product price.  Note that this outcome
relies on an imperfectly elastic labor supply curve.  If international trade has the effect of raising
this elasticity the monopsonist's market power would be diminished.
In Figure 4, the points A, B, and C refer to the case of monopsony in free trade.  With
no monopsony the effective labor supply curve would be perfectly elastic, generating a  wage
equal to the international  wage w . But in a market with limited labor mobility, the employer
chooses to offer a lower wage, wo, and less employment, Lo.  For now suppose that this industry
produces the export good,  say X.  Assuming identical foreign and domestic technologies, the
global wage must exist in the (competitive) importable sector Y in free trade.  Note  that the
monopsony in a small economy can have no impact on the international wage.  The impact of FA
rights  operates  as  described  above.  For  a  given product price,  a  labor  union  could  raise
efficiency by bargaining for a higher employment level, thereby expanding exports.  It could also
reduce  efficiency.
24 Leamer  (1996)  makes  this  point  cogently.
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The labor-demand curve is given by labor's marginal value product, or PXMPLx, where
price is fixed along a given curve.  Suppose that the rest of the world decides to impose a tariff
on exports of this product to protest the absence of union bargaining rights.  The effect would be
to reduce the country's export price, thereby shifting the labor-demand curve in X down to DL.
In  turn,  the monopsonist would  choose yet a  lower employment level,  Lt, and offer  a lower
wage, wt. The lower wage would spill over into the importable sector via a reduced wage, which
is no longer equal to the foreign wage because of the tariff.  Thus, the tariff would reduce wages
and introduce additional inefficiency into the economy.  An import-equivalent quota imposed by
ROW would have the same effect in the initial equilibrium.  Over time, however, the quota is
liable to grant the monopsonist additional wage-depressing power.  For example, a subsequent
technological improvement in home production of good X would raise the wage under  a tariff
restriction by virtue of the higher marginal product of labor.  Under the quota, however, export
quantity is limited,  so that home price of X would fall after the technical change,  limiting or
offsetting the wage increase.
It is worth making a few points about the situation in which the Home economy is large
in  exporting  the  labor-intensive good,  since it  is  often  alleged that  such  a  situation  places
downward  pressure  on wages in  foreign economies,  such as the  United States.  In  fact,  the
analysis points out that if the monopsony lies in the export commodity, its effect would be to
limit production and exports even as it depresses wages.  This would tend to raise the world
price of the labor-intensive good, thereby raising wages abroad.  Introducing union rights in this
case could actually cause foreign wages to decline, depending on the union bargaining objective.
If monopsony were in the importable commodity, however, the spillover into higher production
35and lower  wages in the export good could have some depressing effect on foreign wages. The
extent of  this spillover depends  on ROW  labor-demand elasticity,  which is  a function  of the
initial quantity of labor services exported.
Bringing all of these effects together generates the results in Table 4.  Before leaving the subject
of monopsony, I note that some aspects of monopsony in general equilibrium for a small open
economy have been worked out (Feenstra, 1980), although I have found no such treatment that
combines monopsony with union rights.
3.d.  A Note on Compliance
A  further complication arises  with the  imposition or  strengthening of  labor standards
(Harrison and Leamer,  1997).  Suppose that the informal sector produces an input that is used
intensively in the labor-intensive export sector.  The informal sector does not comply with labor
standards, but firms in the formal sector do.  Under these circumstances, stronger formal-sector
labor standards, such as union rights, job security laws, and health and safety requirements, may
be  expected  to  raise  labor  costs,  resulting  in  lower  formal-sector employment.  Displaced
workers move into informal employment, raising the possibility under certain circumstances that
effective compliance with labor standards is reduced.  In this  sense, stronger labor rights  can
backfire in the general economy.  That average compliance could fall also holds in the event of a
ROW trade restriction on labor-intensive exports.
To  see this,  suppose in Figure  4  that the  imposition of  union  rights  induces a  wage
bargain along DL above point B.  Employment in sector X would fall, raising labor supply in the
informal  economy.  A  lower  wage  there  would  reduce  costs  and  raise  output,  with  the
subsequent reduction  in output price feeding into lower costs in  good X.  Depending on the
elasticity of substitution between the informal intermediate and unionized labor, output could rise
even as net employment remains below its old level.  Thus,  it is possible both for  aggregate
compliance  to  fall  and  labor-intensive exports  to  rise  with  stronger  labor  standards.  This
outcome depends on particular market parameters and is not guaranteed.  It does point out the
need to consider compliance issues carefully in assessing the likely outcomes of labor standards
and trade restrictions.
36Table 4.  The Impacts of Monopsony and Union Rights
Closed Economy:
Monopsony causes inefficiency and reduces wages
Union rights raise efficiency if employment expands
Union rights reduce efficiency if employment contracts
Small Open Economy, Monopsony in Export Sector:
Monopsony reduces exports with no impact on foreign wage
Union rights could expand or contract exports
ROW tariff lowers Home wages in all sectors
ROW quota imparts greater monopsony power over time
Small Open Economy, Monopsony in Import Sector:
Monopsony raises exports with no impact on foreign wage
Union rights could expand or contract exports
ROW tariff lowers Home wages in all sectors
ROW quota imparts greater monopsony power over time
Large Open Economy, Monopsony in Export Sector:
Monopsony reduces exports and raises foreign wage
Union rights could expand or contract exports
ROW tariff lowers Home wages in all sectors
ROW quota imparts greater monopsony power over time
Large Open Economy, Monopsony in Import Sector:
Monopsony raises exports and reduces foreign wage
Union rights could expand or contract exports
ROW tariff lowers Home wages in all sectors
ROW quota imparts greater monopsony power over time
373.e.  Other Claims about Gains in Labor Productivity
Additional claims  are made  by  "neo-institutionalist" advocates of  labor  standards  on
behalf  of potential productivity gains (Sengenberger,  1991).25  The arguments refer  both  to
protection of FA rights and to additional labor-protection regulations, such as minimum wages,
job-security laws, mandated severance packages, and fringe benefits.  Because only the former
relates to core labor standards, I limit the analysis largely to union rights.
The  primary  claim  is  that  the  formation  of  trade  unions  and  collective  bargaining
inproves  labor  productivity,  sustaining higher wages  and  employment.  First,  workers  have
insufficient incentives to  acquire  firm-specific human capital in  the  absence of job  security,
which  could be  a  goal of collective bargaining.  Second,  representation through  trade unions
(especially enterprise unions) makes workers feel more invested in the success of the firm and
they are more likely to reveal productivity-enhancing process innovations to their employers.26
These "voice options" for workers are thought by many to be important sources of productivity
gains.  Third, workers with very low wages may be expected to engage in shirking and stealing
(Tutu,  1993).  Fourth,  the need to work with unions induces firms to be less concerned with
wage-cutting and more concerned with training, innovation, and productivity enhancements.  In
brief,  this  view  expects  substantial  productivity  gains  from  cooperative  labor-management
relations,  in which workers consider themselves to be more than a factor of production.  Such
relations  are pro-competitive in the labor markets,  generating static and dynamic gains.  For
example,  Boyer  (1993)  credits  the  imposition  of  strong  labor-market  institutions,  such  as
minimum wages and job  regulations, with fostering post-war European growth and encouraging
adoption of technological and  organizational innovations.  Similarly, Piore  (1994) studied the
19h-century U.S.  textile industry, in which labor standards were absent and employers made no
efforts to  train  workers or improve labor-management relations.  Labor standards  (safety and
health regulations) mandated by the government forced employers to adopt technological changes
and to reorganize management, with a consequent rise in productivity.
Analytically,  these  claims  rest  on  perceived  imperfections in  labor  markets  that  are
overcome through collective arrangements.  To the extent that unions bargain for job  security,
contracts serve as insurance against adverse market outcomes for workers.  Collective bargaining
can solve  moral  hazard  problems  or  selectivity problems  that  encourage employers  to  offer
contracts and benefits that are inadequate relative to socially desirable levels (Summers, 1989).
Prisoners' dilemma games can be constructed in which individual firms underinvest in training or
pay  wages  that  are  too  low  to  encourage  the  adoption  of  productivity-enhancing  labor
agreements.  There may also be informational problems in labor markets.  For example, firms
may not  divulge  risk  characteristics in  particular job  classifications (Brown,  Deardorff,  and
25  Freeman (1993) discusses differences between the "distortionist" view of labor standards and the neo-
institutionalist view.
26This possibility is often lauded as a source of  excellent labor-management relations in Japan.
38Stem,  1996; Maskus, Rutherford, and Selby, 1995).  Bargaining solutions could overcome such
problems.
The attainment of social objectives, such as redistribution to low-income workers, could
be  promoted with  collective bargaining rights.  Cooperative arrangements among government,
business,  and  labor  interests  ("tripartite  approaches")  are  claimed  to  assist  in  promoting
transitions  from  authoritarian  to  democratic governments by  ensuring adherence to  collective
norms  and  rules  (Tokman,  1993).  Cooperative bargaining  is  also justified  as  a  means of
reducing uncertainty, thereby encouraging investment and employment.
Analytical treatnent  of  such claims  is beyond  the scope  of this  report,  for  it  would
require thorough consideration of an extensive literature in labor economics without adding much
to the fundamental issues of labor standards and trade.  Some observations are worth making,
however.  First,  while these claims do not all follow from rigorous theory (Freeman,  1993),
most could hold under  some market circumstances.  Their validity is an  empirical matter and
evidence suggests that labor protection mechanisms have only weak and ambiguous effects on
growth,  structural  adjustment, and income distribution in developing nations (Freeman,  1993;
Marshall,  1994; ILO,  1992; Rama, 1994, 1995; MacIsaac and Rama, 1997; Bell, 1997).  While
there  are  important  microeconomic  nuances  to  consider  (Marshall,  1994),  the  empirical
"scorecard"  favors neither the view that labor regulations distort efficient economies nor  the
view that regulations enhance efficiency and growth (Freeman, 1993).  The most careful study is
by Rama (1995), who investigated the econometric linkages between economic performance in
Latin American and Caribbean nations over the period 1980-1992 and measures of labor-market
interventions, such as ratification of ILO conventions (see Section 4), annual paid leave,  social
security contributions,  the minimum wage,  and an  aggregate index of labor-market rigidity.
Also included were unionization rates, the size of government employment, and macroeconomic
determinants of growth and labor costs.  The essential message was that much ambiguity exists.
More rigid labor markets performed worse in terms of growth, but this was not due to  labor-
market  interventions.  Rather,  inefficient government employment and high unionization rates
were  the  most  likely  explanations for  poor  performance,  with  unions  having a  particularly
negative  effect  in  countries  with  strong  barriers  to  product-market  competition.  Rama  is
appropriately  cautious  in  drawing  policy  implications,  though  he  suggests  that  reform  of
government employment and market liberalization provide the most effective routes to improving
labor-market  performance.27  Again,  however,  the  evidence  with  respect  to  labor-market
regulations provides modest support for both the distrortionist and neo-institutionalist views.
Second, to a considerable extent any potential productivity gains from providing greater
job  security through union rights would accrue to firms in higher profits or output.  The question
27Rama  and Tabellini  (1997)  present a model  in which  product-market  distortions  and labor-market
distortions  are jointly determined. In their model, labor-market  distortions,  such as a minimum  wage, are optimal
responses  to barriers to product  competition,  such as trade restrictions. In turn, policy  should  be focused  on
removing  product-market  restrictions,  causing  labor-market  policies  to adjust endogenously  and move also in a
liberalizing  direction. See also Rama  (1997).
39arises as to why firms do not themselves provide FA  rights. As indicated above, there may be
market-structure  complications making it difficult to  appropriate these gains.  In  such  cases,
labor-market interventions need to be focused on the market failure or externality.  Providing a
subsidy to  training  is one  example and mandating union  rights is  another.  This observation
points  to  the  need  for  case-by-case analysis,  focusing on  market  structure  within  sectors.
Moreover,  the potential efficiency gains or losses from CLS would depend on the underlying
policy framework.
Third,  rights  to  collective  bargaining  may  not  be  the  most  appropriate  forms  of
intervention (OECD,  1996; Farber,  1986).  It  is  possible that  labor unions  would  insist on
working-conditions standards that go beyond the efficient levels, or that the working conditions
negotiated are aimed at creating rents or redistributing income or setting exclusionary practices.
There  is  considerable  evidence of  distortionary  union  wage  premia  in  developed  countries
(Freeman and Medoff,  1984). To the extent that union objectives are inconsistent with aggregate
preferences,  the economy would suffer a loss in efficiency.  I found no systematic evidence on
the efficiency effects of union rights (as opposed to union activities) across countries, though it is
evident that efficient forms of union and firm organization vary across countries.
Moving beyond FA rights to CLS generally, it is sometimes claimed that CLS may be
used  to  induce  greater  entry  into  the  formal  sector  from  the  informal  sector.  To  the
(questionable) extent that employment in the formal sector provides additional productivity gains
through learning-by-doing, there are dynamic gains for the economy.  Again, one must wonder
about the nature of the market failure that prevents appropriation of these returns.  Regarding the
main claim about shifting workers out  of the informal sector, there appear to be a number of
potentially conflicting models.  One possibility is that CLS could be extended as far as possible
into the informal sector (e.g.,  limits on child labor employment in carpets or home service, FA
rights in apparel and agriculture; note that this implicitly suggests that the informal sector itself
can be brought into the regulated economy, which is a notion almost surely doomed to fail).  To
the  extent  that  this  raises  relative  costs  in  the  informal  sector,  there  could  be  some  labor
migration to  the formal sector -- a  "cost-push" model.  A second possibility is that stronger
enforcement of CLS in the formal sector would expand employment, as in the monopsony stories
explained earlier  -- a  "demand-pull" model.  The latter case is also consistent with relatively
rapid dynamic growth in labor demand in the formal sector.  These outcomes are by no means
necessary,  however.  Higher  costs  in  the  formal  sector  could  push  additional  activity  and
workers  into  the  informal  sector,  reducing  aggregate compliance with  CLS  (Harrison  and
Leamer,  1997).  Further,  exclusionary activities by trade unions could reduce labor demand in
the covered sectors.
An  unstudied issue in this literature relates to the potential relationship between CLS
and efficiency wages in developing countries.  The operations of trade unions can interfere with
the operation  of  efficiency wages to  induce optimal levels of effort.  It  can be  argued,  for
example, that one reason export sectors (even those with limited FA rights -- see OECD (1996))
tend to pay higher wages than the rest of the economy is the need to ensure output of global
40quality through efficiency premia in wages.  The injection of CLS into these sectors could reduce
wages and export competitiveness simultaneously, though this is not the necessary outcome.
None  of this additional analysis strengthens the case for  using trade  sanctions against
nations with limited CLS or for international harmonization of standards.
3.f.  Trade-Related International Labor Standards
In this section I analyze three complaints about limited CLS and their alleged impacts on
foreign  economies.28  These  complaints  include  the  operation  of  export  processing  zones,
international wage spillovers, and the "race to the bottom" in labor standards.  I also discuss the
potential role of consumer preferences in rich countries in improving CLS in poor countries.
Export-Processing Zones
Core  labor standards may be introduced across most of the economy but exempted (or
weakened) in the export sector.  This latter case is important for understanding the effects of
export processing zones (EPZs) on wages, efficiency, and exports and to  assess the basis for
claiming  that  export-specific  exemptions from  CLS  constitute an  actionable  export  subsidy
(Rodrik, 1995).
Cost-benefit analyses of particular EPZs suggest that they are unlikely to have provided
much net gain for their host countries (UNCTAD,  1993 and Warr,  1987).  Employment growth
in EPZs has been dynamic in a number of countries (China, Malaysia, Mauritius, and elsewhere)
but less impressive in others.  It is possible that the additional employment would have emerged
without the EPZs,  due to  globalization of production locations and labor-cost advantages and
rising female participation rates in poor countries, though there is no serious assessment of this
counterfactual.  The evidence on whether exports are higher than they might have been otherwise
is mixed, while impacts of EPZs on the balance of payments are often negative because of the
implied increase in demand for intermediate imports.  Backward linkages to input suppliers and
sub-contractors are often limited by the need of exporting firms to have access to certain and
high-quality inputs.  However, in some countries this linkage has strengthened and provided an
incentive for quality upgrading and training among sub-contractors.  This effect is stronger  in
EPZs that are dominated by joint ventures, as opposed to wholly-owned subsidiaries of foreign
firms.  While  forward  linkages are strictly  limited by restrictions  on domestic  sales of  EPZ
outputs, there may be some gains from greater consumer variety and product-side competition.
28See also Hoe (1995).
41Formal trade-theoretic analyses of the welfare impacts of EPZs are pessimistic about their
potential gains.  29EPZs  are themselves economnic  distortions because they provide differential tax
and tariff treatment.  Their introduction into undistorted economies reduces efficiency, while in
distorted economies they are second-best tools that could raise or lower economic well-being.
That  literature pays no attention to the labor-standards aspects of EPZs.  One important
question is whether EPZs might be  expected to raise or lower pressures for adopting stronger
union rights. The introduction of EPZs into a distorted economy could raise or lower economiic
efficiency (and growth).  If growth performance is imnproved,  one would anticipate endogenously
rising union rights.  It seems possible that, even if one component of the inducements package
were  limiited union  rights within the EPZs,  this  indirect impact could eventually raise overall
labor standards.  On the other hand,  if EPZs worsen efficiency and growth performance, one
would expect to see falling labor standards.
Consider next the effect of EPZs on host-country wages. I discussed earlier in the report
that available evidence indicates that firms in EPZs tend to pay higher wages than firms outside
EPZs.,  along with  several  possible explanations. Rather  than appealing to  disparate  factors,
however,  it is possible to understand the role of EPZs in a modeling framework.  For example,
suppose  that  the  host  government  introduces  an  EPZ  in  an  economy  with  substantial
employment in the informal sector at low wages, with some formal-sector manufacturing in a
capital-intensive intermediate import and a labor-intensive export.  The formal sector has higher
wages  either  because the  workers  are more  skilled or  due  to  a  minimum wage,  generating
Harris-Todaro unemployment.  The EPZ requires that labor-intensive assembly be undertaken to
qualify for benefits.
The direct effects of the EPZ may be classified as follows.  First, the elimination of the
tariff on  intermediate imports into production in the EPZ  (but not  for production outside the
EPZ)  reduces unit costs, expanding output within the EPZ.  This can be expected to raise. the
demand for low-skilled labor if manufacturing within the EPZ is labor-intensive, while it lowers
the return to capital.  Second, the favorable tax treatmnent  and subsidy to fixed costs within EPZs
is likely to attract foreign capital.  This effect would also expand labor demand.  Note that both
of these impacts would attract domestic labor into the EPZ,  raising wages outside the area as
well.  Third,  it is conceivable that firms within the EPZ  might insist on the ability to choose
workers it wishes to train and retain,  suggesting that some limitation on inward labor mobility
could emerge as an endogenous policy response.  If so, wages would rise by more in the EPZ
than outside it.  Whether the EPZ would raise or lower HT-type unemployment would depend
on its imnpact  on the probability of modern-sector employment.  On the one hand,  output and
labor demand rise in the EPZ, but, on the other hand, output and labor demand fall in the other
modern sector.  The higher wage would attract more workers to the queue, while the net rise in
labor demand should expand employment, leaving an amnbiguous  outcome.
29See Hamada (1974), Hamilton and Svensson (1982), Miyagiwa (1986, 1993), Young (1987), and Young and
Miyagiwa (1987).
42However, there will be indirect impacts as well, relating to union rights.  If firms in the
EPZ insist on limited labor rights, the monopsony stories discussed earlier have some relevance.
It  is conceivable that such firms could choose to limit employment in order  to reduce wages
compared  to  the  non-EPZ  outcome,  though  the  full  result  would  be  some  average  of  the
employment-expanding effects and the employment-reducing effects.  The wage rate could fall in
relation to the non-EPZ case, though this  is by no means a certain outcome.  If,  on the other
hand,  firms  in  the EPZ  provide union  rights,  the  situation of bilateral  monopoly emerges.
Accordingly,  employment could be  larger  (due to demand increases) or  lower  (due to  union
preferences to restrict labor supply), though it would seem likely in this case that the wage would
end up higher.  Note one interesting implication of introducing strong union rights into EPZs is
that unionized workers would enjoy a union wage premium over workers outside the EPZs.
Therefore, one way of interpreting  U.S. and EU policy favoring bargaining rights in EPZs is as
an expression of preference for lower wages for less favored workers outside those areas.
In summary, there is no theoretical presumption that EPZs raise export competitiveness
and  expand trade.  Their  impacts on host-country wages are  also  ambiguous, depending on
circumstances, though there is evidence that firms in EPZs pay higher wages than comparable
local firms.  As discussed earlier, there is considerable variation across countries in the extent of
union rights in EPZs,  though some countries limit such rights.  How the introduction of such
rights would affect wages and exports depends on structural characteristics of the labor markets
within which EPZs operate.
Static  analyses of  this  kind  have been  severely criticized  for  ignoring  the  potential
dynamic gains from  learning-by-doing, training,  and altering social attitudes toward  work and
entrepreneurship  (Johansson,  1994).  It  is  sometimes argued,  for example,  that by providing
significant amounts of formal-sector employment to female workers, EPZs can have a liberating
effect on female work efforts and access to modern capital markets. 30 These impacts on human-
resource development may be thought to have important endogenous growth effects via stronger
incentives for human-capital accumulation and risk-taking.  It has also been argued that having
more export-oriented,  foreign-owned firms in EPZs provides a catalyst to domestic firms who
might not otherwise break into export markets (Romer, 1993).  To my knowledge, no systematic
studies  of  these processes  have been undertaken,  although  some observers  claim  Mauritius'
recent success in export markets is intimately related to technology diffusion and demonstration
effects emanating from its EPZ.
Comparative Advantage and International Wage Spillovers
Organized  labor  interests  in  high-wage countries  are  concerned  about the  effects  of
limited CLS  in  low-wage  countries  on  their  own  labor markets.  Different  levels  of  labor
30This  observation  is reminiscent  of Ame Krueger's  comment  (World  Bank  Conference  on the Uruguay  Round,
January, 1995)  that one great advantage  of "female  sweatshops"  is that they provide  better-valued  alternatives  for
women  than traditional  modes  of work.
43standards can affect trade flows, as several models presented here indicate.  Less obvious are
claims that the effects on trade flows or prices are significant or easily predictable.  Moreover,
implications for employment, wages, and wage inequality in high-wage countries are unclear but
likely trivial.  For  example, it is estimated that less than five percent of children  working in
developing countries are engaged in export sectors, while their contribution to output is small.  3
However,  there are  particular  sectors, such as carpets, footwear, and apparel,  in which child
labor is more prevalent, calling for careful industry-level studies.
To place the wage issue in perspective, note first that there are numerous reasons why
wages  are  not  equalized  internationally.  First,  countries  may  employ  different  production
technologies and  workers  may  exhibit  different productivities and  skills,  as  in  the  standard
Ricardian model.  Alternatively, they may use particular technologies with vastly different levels
of efficiency (Trefler,  1995 and Maskus, 1991).  Second, countries may effectively specialize in
different goods, preventing wage equalization even in the neoclassical trade model.  Third, trade
in  goods  may not  be  fully  integrated internationally, with  transport costs  and  trade  barriers
tending to  depress wages in labor-abundant nations.  Fourth,  labor and capital are  not  fully
mobile  across  nations.  Finally,  distortions  in  factor  markets,  such  as  factor  taxes  and
monopsony power, can sustain differences in wages.
As is well-known, there is considerable debate about the importance of trade competition
for  wages  (Richardson,  1995).  In  both  the  United  States and  the  EU,  wage  and  income
inequality have  increased since the  1980s.  The employment mix has  shifted towards  skilled
workers and  structural unemployment has risen,  at least in the EU.  The data reveal that the
rising  inequality  is  coincident  with  the  opening  of  markets  to  international  trade.  This
correlation  does  not  necessarily  imply  causation.  Changes  in  technology,  demographics,
regulation,  and  unionization  rates  could  also  be  responsible  for  these  labor  market  trends
(Richardson, 1995).
There  is  much  controversy  over  the  role  of  trade  (more  properly,  international
competition through prices) in determining the employment and wage trends of the industrialized
economies. Some authors claim that trade has deleterious effects on the distribution of income.
For  example, Wood  (1994) argues that trade  with the NICs  is one of the primary  causes of
income inequality and structural employment in the industrialized world.  Leamer (1996) also
finds a substantial effect of falling textile prices on U.S.  wage growth within the context of the
Stolper-Samuelson model, though the effects were concentrated in the 1970s.  On the other hand,
some authors contend that trade plays little,  if any,  role.  Baldwin and  Cain (1995) find that
intemational  trade  explains,  at most,  nine percent  of the  growing U.S.  wage  inequality that
occurred between 1977 and 1987.  Krugman and Lawrence (1993) and Lawrence and Slaughter
(1993)  also maintain  that trade  has had  little influence on the  distribution  of  income  in  the
developed economies.
31 U.S. Department of Labor (1994).
44The point of this brief review is to point out that it is misleading to ascribe differences in
wages (or changes in these differences) to differential labor standards, although labor standards
are part of the equation.  Rather,  one must carefully sort out what is going on in the broader
national and international economies to be confident that labor standards are a decisive factor.
Nor would policy changes that weaken labor standards necessarily correlate with  lower wages in
poor  countries,  higher  exports  and lower  export prices from  those  countries,  and  ultimately
downward wage  pressure  in  the  importing countries.  For  example,  stronger  labor  standards
could shift effective labor-market power from monopsony firms to unions,  with the result that
wages rise but employment and exports possibly fall.  Strong statements are impossible in this
general milieu.
A standard claim about limited CLS is that they artificially (that is,  in some way that is
inconsistent with social preferences) lower wages and thereby reduce wages in the rich countries
as  a  matter of  competition.  This  is a  powerful argument  in the  political debate over  labor
standards, so it is important to analyze how this effect would work.  I consider here the strongest
possible version that would support this case and indicate which parameters would have to be
known in order to understand the maximum extent of the spillover wage effects.  Keep in mind,
however,  that most of the analysis presented earlier points to deficient CLS limiting economic
efficiency and exports, rather than expanding exports.
A model depicting the extreme case is presented in Annex Two.  In that model a labor
union sets a minimum wage in the export sector of a large developing country. The minimum
wage  generates unemployment and  a smaller export volume.  Thus,  in  the absence of union
rights, exports would be larger,  putting downward pressure on world price of that good.  The
increase in equilibrium exports depends on the ratio of the union wage to the non-union wage,
industry  factor  intensities and  factor  substitution possibilities,  and  import  demand  elasticity
abroad,  among other variables.  Using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem,  the impact on wage
changes in the importing country depends on factor intensities there.  If both goods have similar
intensities the wage impact could be  substantial in theory.  However,  if factor intensities are
quite different  (as would be  the case for  highly labor-intensive importables such  as apparel,
footwear, and electronics in comparison with other sectors) the wage effect is muted.
In  short,  in  order  to  calculate the effects of  limited CLS  in  poor  countries  on wage
competition in rich countries, a long list of parameters must be estimated.  In this context, two
final observations are worth making.  First, going through such an exercise should be persuasive
that the impacts are likely to be quite small.  The main issues relate to how extensive the wage
change in the poor country is from limited CLS, which is likely to be small in the context of an
elastic labor pool, and how important the resulting export change is in global trade.
Second, this analysis should give pause to those who think it will be straightforward to
calculate  a  meaningful  "social  dumping  margin"  for  purposes  of  offsetting  foreign  wage
repression.  Doing so requires understanding a significant set of economic interrelationships and
the relevant parameters governing those interrelationships.  Inevitably, however, if such margins
were to become a focus of trade policy, they would be calculated on the basis of rules of thumb.
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wages are below some international norm) would overstate any real effects on wages in the poor
countries.  It is likely that  imposing countervailing tariffs on this basis would overcorrect any
spillover problem into rich-country wages.
Competitive  Impacts  on Standards
A  common  complaint  about  variable  international  standards  in  the  face  of  rising
international trade, technology, and capital flows is that competition will reduce standards in the
higher-standard countries.  Thus,  there will be a  "race to the bottom" in labor standards,  as is
often claimed for environmental standards as well.  There appear to be two variants of this claim
made with  respect to  labor standards.  First,  some fear a  global decline in standards  to  low
levels.  Second,  the competition in  standards may be  concentrated among low-wage  nations,
thereby preventing countries that would otherwise move toward higher standards from doing so.
The simple argument that competition can push standards toward their lowest  levels is
wrong on its face, for it presumes that the lowest standards would prevail as market outcomes,
when  the  extent  of  competition itself  influences endogenous  standards.  It  is  unlikely  that,
accounting for  global income levels and technologies, African or South Asian labor standards
would emerge in international competition.  Moreover, it is questionable that integrated markets
must see convergent labor standards.  There remain considerably different standards across the
states in the United States, despite completely free trade in goods and capital and essentially free
labor mobility.
Economists point out that an open economy can sustain its high standards through some
combination of higher taxes, lower wages, and exchange-rate devaluation (Ehrenberg, 1995, and
Rodrik,  1995).  The  extent to  which  workers thereby  "invest" in  higher  standards  through
reduced purchasing power depends on elasticities of labor supply and preferences.
Thus,  a more reasonable claim is that higher-standards countries might have to moderate
their labor protection somewhat as a competitive measure.  This question bears more study and
careful attention to modeling.  However, some observations are worth making.  First, countries
that believe  they  feel  pressure  to  reduce  labor  standards  might  instead  be  feeling  pressure
associated with maintaining other, more inefficient, labor-market distortions.  Second, although
it is  clear  that multinational enterprises in  labor-intensive sectors  invest on the  basis  of low
wages, there is little systematic evidence that these incentives are markedly enhanced by poor
32 labor standards,  as reviewed below.  Third, to the extent that labor standards are inefficient,
international competition will lead to pressure to modify them in ways that expand productivity.
32A  parallel is the finding by Levinsohn (1996) that there is little evidence of firms investing abroad on the basis of
weak environmental standards.  See also Klevorick (1996).
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The provision  of CLS,  especially with respect to protecting children from  exploitative
work, could enter positively into utility functions abroad, presumably with  a strongly positive
income elasticity. 33 To  analyze this case,  suppose that a developed country produces a  set  of
"high-standards"  goods  and  a  developing country  produces  a  set  of  "low-standards"  goods
(Freeman,  1984). The goods are imperfect substitutes in consumption and consumers in both
countries  obtain  utility  from  consuming  both  goods.  Let  labor  standards  be  a  private
consumption good desired by consumers in the developed economy.  That is, consumers in the
rich country get greater  satisfaction from consuming poor-country goods if they are produced
under better working conditions . Suppose that the higher the income of the individual consumer
in the rich country, the greater the willingness to pay for standards, thereby generating a demand
curve for labor standards.
If a willingness to pay for standards exists, there should be economic returns available to
producers  from  improving  their  employment  conditions,  suggesting  little  need  for  public
provision of CLS. That this solution has not emerged in many countries indicates that the returns
may  be  insufficient to  cover  the  costs  of  adopting higher  standards  because  the  available
premium  is  small (this would depend, inter alia, on the  substitution elasticity between high-
standard and low-standard goods).  More likely, there are informational difficulties leading to a
missing market  -- that is, consumers are willing to pay for (certified) standards but there is no
market  for  standards that emerges endogenously.  Thus, there  is a market failure.  The best
policy is to create a market for standards with product labeling.  The labeling, if accurate, would
generate price premia on high-standards goods and extract surplus from high-income consumers,
thereby paying for the costs of labeling and process upgrading.  This would improve efficiency,
generating a  static gain  (and perhaps  also  dynamic gains  if  standards  rise  over  time  and  if
children are pushed into education).
However, one cannot expect the goods market to produce accurate labeling of standards
on its own, though to some extent this is already happening.  The explanation for this failure is
that firms providing certification have an incentive to cheat (and their signals are not credible). 34
Some external agency would be required to guarantee accuracy of labeling, presumably paid for
by a tax on consumers in the developed economy. This solution would generate a compensatory
transfer from consumers in the developed economies to producers in the developing economies in
the name of higher labor standards, without interfering with trade.  In contrast, a tariff on the
developing-country  goods  would  induce  substitution toward  the  developed-economy  goods
without any necessary impact on CLS.
33It might be  feasible to emulate the Grossman-Krueger (1993) calculations on the income profile of demand for
environmental protection with a cross-country regression.
34Rodrik (1996) argues that the reason for limited development  of product-labeling schemes is that utility functions
demonstrate positive external effects that cannot be priced.
473.g.  Review of Empirical Evidence on Labor Standards and Trade
There  is  some  empirical  evidence about the  effects  of differential  levels  of  CLS  on
exports and export prices. 35 The OECD (1996) related measures of export performance, both in
the aggregate and (correctly) for labor-intensive goods, to indications of limited labor standards.
No relationship exists in their data. Neither could they detect any correlations between measures
of revealed comparative advantage and attempts to suppress union rights.  The OECD also could
not  detect  any  effects  of  CLS  on  U.S.  import prices  in  textiles and  apparel  across  trading
partners.  Nor was there any indication that export prices for hand-made carpets are lower in
countries  with  extensive use  of child  labor.  Regarding  carpets  manufactured with  artificial
textiles, Turkey  (with  limited CLS) had  higher average  export prices  than Belgium  and  the
Netherlands.  They conclude that differences in CLS have little evident effect on patterns  of
specialization, competitiveness, or exports.  36
Rodrik (1996) econometrically related basic measures of labor standards across countries,
such  as  ratification  of  ILO  conventions covering  core  labor  standards  and  an  indicator of
enforcement problems in child labor standards, to international trade flows.  He was unable to
determine any relationship in the data.  Neither could Rodrik find any suggestion of a positive
statistical relationship between low labor standards and inward flows of foreign direct investment
from the United States across countries.  Indeed, there was some evidence that FDI is lower than
expected in  countries with  limited CLS.  Thus,  there seems little reason to  conclude that the
effects of limited child labor standards or union rights or of EPZs on trade performance or FDI
are noteworthy in a statistical sense.
Aggarwal (1995) noted that it is common in developing countries for labor standards to
be  lower  in  less  export-oriented  sectors  and  in  non-traded  goods  than  in  export-oriented
industries,  including even textiles and carpeting.  Within all manufacturing, workers in  firms
with  high  export-output  ratios tend to  receive  greater wages  and benefits  than those  in  less
export-oriented firms.  She also discovered no  association between U.S.  FDI  and poor  labor
standards  in  developing  countries.  In  fact,  she noted that  U.S.  FDI  is  not  concentrated  in
countries or sectors with low labor standards.  Moreover, countries with weaker labor standards
do  not have higher import-penetration rates in the United States than countries with  stronger
labor  standards.  In  summary,  she  found  no  indication that  export  success  in  developing
countries is due to cost advantages based on inadequate CLS.
This  evidence will  not  satisfy  those  who  are  concerned  about  the  impacts  of  labor
standards (and EPZs) on competitiveness.  The studies can be criticized for their inabilities to
measure CLS effectively, given the inherent difficulties with data in this area.  Further criticisms
are that the studies did not adequately control for other significant impacts on trade and FDI,  and
also because they are static (cross-section) in nature.  Many observers, for example, point to the
rapid increases in manufactured exports from EPZs in China (where CLS are not fully respected,
35Stem  (1996)  provides  a more thorough  review.
36See  also ILO (1995c),  which finds  that cost savings  from the use of child  labor are small.
48though it is unknown if this fact explains export growth) and suspect that their effects will rise
markedly in the future.
Note  that if  deficient CLS do  not notably stimulate export strength in unskilled-labor
intensive goods, they can hardly have much effect on sectoral labor demands and wages abroad.
Even if they were thought to reduce global prices of textiles, apparel, footwear, and electronics,
these price effects would have to filter through into labor markets in rich nations in the ways I
have indicated.
It should also be  reiterated that labor-market distress in OECD nations is not the only
source of concern over  labor standards.  Krueger (1996) presents  an econometric analysis of
sponsorship in the U.S. Congress of the Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1995 (S. 706 and H.R.
2065).  Representatives from districts with high concentrations of low-skilled workers were less
likely to  sponsor the act than were those from districts with low concentrations of low-skilled
workers.  He interprets this to mean that interest in the bill is primarily associated with altruistic
preferences for reducing child labor use abroad.  While this result is suggestive, the approach is
subject to considerable criticism, as noted in Srinivasan (1996).  A primary problem is that a
decision not to co-sponsor a bill does not demonstrate lack of support for it.
3.h.  Summary
A  summary of the main findings is useful.  First,  gains in  efficiency from  CLS  are
possible,  depending on the circumstances.  There are many cases where  improving workers'
rights in an industry, or for the economy as a whole, can improve productivity for the industry
or  the  economy.  Such efficiency gains are  required if  the entire  economy  is to  gain from
stronger rights through higher incomes, although it is possible that income gains would not be
shared across all individuals.
Second,  sectoral  gains  may simply shift  resources.  As  many cases  analyzed  earlier
demonstrated,  stronger  workers'  rights  could benefit  one  sector  in  terms  of  its  competitive
advantage,  but  this  means that  output and  relative advantage decline  in  other  sectors.  For
example, introducing union rights into the exportable sector could raise wages there but reduce
wages in other sectors or generate unemployment.  That is to say, stronger CLS could worsen
economic conditions in  other  sectors unless the primary effect  of CLS  is to  raise aggregate
efficiency in the economy.
Third,  the  impacts  of  limited  CLS  on  trade  advantage depend  on  several  complex
characteristics.  For  example, while discrimination and monopsony create inefficiencies in the
economy,  it is often not  the case that they increase export competitiveness.  The monopsony
models provide perhaps the most striking conclusions.  It is  unclear even in principle whether
strengthening union  rights  in  monopsonized sectors  would  reduce exports  of  labor-intensive
goods
49Fourth, the likelihood that inadequate CLS in  developing countries place downward
pressure on wages in developed  countries is small.  Theory points to a number of complex
linkages that would limit such effects, particularly  in light of the small trade shares involved.
Empirical  evidence  demonstrates  no relationship  between  labor  standards  and export performance
or FDI.
Fifth,  the  impacts of  trade  restrictions taken by  foreign countries depend on  the
circumstances  and could  backfire if their goal is to improve  the situation  of workers with limited
rights.  Much depends  on issues such as whether  the sector with weak rights is labor-intensive,
whether it is the exportable sector, and what linkages there are to the informal or residual-
employment  sectors.
Before leaving the analytical  section, the pragmatic  position of some labor economists
(Freeman, 1994 and Krueger, 1996) should  be acknowledged. Their view, consonant  with that
of many advocates  of stronger CLS,  is that trade sanctions  may be useful in inducing  adoption
of stronger labor standards, which makes their use defensible  even in light of their efficiency
costs and welfare losses.  They further argue that future multilateral and  regional trade
agreements may be used to encourage stronger standards in return for providing additional
market access. The analysis  here casts doubt on the former  claim.  The latter argument  may be
more sensible, given its emphasis  on mutual international  gains, but poses difficult  problems of
implementation  as discussed  in the following  section.
4.  Institutional Issues
Space constraints dictate a  reasonably concise overview here.  Many good discussions
exist  in  the  literature,  including  historical  overviews  of  attempts  to  link  trade  and  labor
standards. 37 Here,  I discuss activities undertaken by  the International Labor  Organization, the
World Trade Organization, and the United States.
4.a.  International Labor Organization
The International Labor Organization (ILO) is the primary international body devoted to
the implementation and monitoring of labor standards.  The ILO was founded in  1919 as an
outgrowth of the Treaty of Versailles and in an atmosphere of concern about both inadequate
labor protection
and the potentially mercantilist manipulation of labor standards to gain a competitive advantage
in exporting.  The ILO has a  tripartite organizational structure, involving an annual "legislative"
conference of labor, business, and governmental representatives of member nations, a 56-person
governing body consisting of 28 governmental representatives and  14 representatives each  of
37See  OECD (1996), Sengenberger  and Campbell  (1995), ILO (1994),  Woolcock  (1995),  van Liemt (1989), and
Charnovitz  (1987).
50worker and business organizations, and a Secretariat in Geneva.  The ILO Constitution requires
the labor and business delegates to be selected from each country without interference from each
other or from public agencies and to be representative of national labor and business interests.
By  all  accounts,  this  requirement  is met  credibly  in  the overwhelming majority  of  nations;
indeed, the ILO reserves and exercises the right not to seat representatives whose legitimacy is in
doubt in this sense.
LO  Conventions
The  ILO has  two main functions.  The first  is to  promote  higher international labor
standards through the preparation of international conventions; currently there are  174 of these
covering all manner of potential labor standards. There is a substantial discrepancy between ILO
membership  (virtually  all  countries  are  members)  and  ratification  of  these  conventions.
Ratification is sporadic across countries for a variety of reasons.  Ratification is taken to imply
that the convention in question will be written into national law.  Often the convention is not
strictly  consistent with  laws  for  technical reasons  and  a  country will  not  ratify  it,  despite
providing labor protection that may be substantially equivalent in practice.  For example, much
U.S.  labor law is the prerogative of states (e.g.,  right-to-work laws), making adoption of many
conventions problematic.  In other cases countries may find the convention to be written in an
inflexible  way  that  does  not  permit  exceptions desired  by  local  legislatures.  A  standard
complaint against the ILO  conventions is that they are  rigid and  often do not  accommodate
legitimate national variations in labor practices, even if minor.  Finally, countries may disagree
with the thrust of particular conventions and simply choose not to ratify them.
It is instructive to consider ratification problems of the seven ILO conventions that the
ILO considers "fundamental" in that they are aimed at promoting the core labor standards (which
are  "basic  social rights"  in that  body's  view)  listed above  8  As  of  November,  1995,  149
countries in the ILO had chosen not to ratify at least one of these conventions, suggesting that
difficulties with their  structure are fairly endemic.  In Table 5 I  list ratification decisions by
selected major countries.  Organized along the lines of Portes' classification, the conventions are
as follows.
Basic Rights
Convention number 29,  the Forced Labor Convention (1930),  and convention number
105, the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (1957) focus on the issue of compulsory labor.
Forced  labor  is  defined  as  work  required  under  threat  of  penalty  and  extracted  without  a
voluntary offer by the worker.  They condemn slavery and bonded labor and also (number 105)
exhort that compulsory labor is not to be used for purposes of political coercion or education,
forced  economic  development,  or  as  disciplinary devices  against  strikes.  The  conventions
contain broad prohibitions against prison labor.  Certain exceptions allowing compulsory labor
38See ILO (1995a, 1995b), OECD (1996), and Woolcock (1995)
51are provided for (number 29).  Work may be mandated by the government if it is in the public
interest  and  in response  to  "imminent necessity" (e.g.,  impending war),  or  for  normal  civic
obligations,  or  for  compulsory  military  service.  Work  may  be  required  also  of  convicted
prisoners in the public interest.  Prison work is disallowed if it is contracted privately, unless the
work is performed under public supervision or is voluntary on the part of the prisoners.
As  of  November,  1995,  138 countries had  ratified  Convention number  29  and  116
countries had ratified Convention number 105.  The United States has ratified only number 105;
among the OECD nations Canada and Turkey also have chosen not to ratify number 29 (Japan
has  ratified number 29 but not  number 105).  China has not ratified any of  the fundamental
conventions, but is "meticulously studying" them for potential ratification to the extent they can
inform future reforms in the labor market (ILO,  1995b).  The United States continues to reject
ratification of number 29 because its state laws conflict with the provisions on prison labor.  In
particular,  the growing trend toward private sub-contracting of the operation of prison facilities
could well be found to conflict with the prohibition of private supervision of prison labor.  The
Philippines objects to several of the categories of exemptions from forced labor and refuses to
ratify number 29,  however  it argues that  its ratification of number 105 requires  it to abolish
compulsory  labor more  broadly.  Mozambique takes an  interesting position:  because  it  has
already done what it can to eliminate forced labor "...within  the institutional capacities of the
country"  (ILO,  1995b, p.4),  there  is  no  need to  ratify number  29  (presumably  because  of
political opposition to doing so).  Mozambique recognizes that forced labor may be a problem in
rural areas that go unmonitored,  but  it relies  on reports from  trade unions  and human rights
organizations to identify these.  Malaysia has formally denounced Convention number 105 as an
interference with its political and development processes and has no plans to revisit the decision.
Freedom from discrimination is also considered a basic right by the ILO and is promoted
by two  fundamental conventions, number  100, Equal Remuneration (1950) and number  111,
Discrimination in  Employment and Occupation (1958).  Number  100 calls for  equal pay  for
work  of  equal  value,  without regard  to  gender.  This  provision  may  be  given  effect  by  a
combination of  laws and regulations,  wage determination devices,  and collective bargaining.
"Objective appraisal" of jobs is suggested as a means of determining the meaning of  "work of
equal value."  Number 111 mandates the elimination of discrimination in employment, training,
and access to particular occupations on the basis of race,  color, sex, religion, political opinion,
social origin or national extraction.  Discrimination could arise from any "distinction, exclusion,
or preference" made on the basis of any of these personal characteristics.
As of November,  1995, Convention number  100 had been ratified by  124 nations and
number 111 by 119 nations.  The United States has ratified neither convention, again because of
concerns about their technical consistency with American laws.  For example, it is claimed that
the  ILO  conception  of  "equal  remuneration  for  work  of  equal  value"  does  not  match  the
American legal standard of "equal pay for substantially equal work."  Nevertheless, U.S.  laws
are  substantially in  compliance with the  spirit  of the  convention.  Convention  111 is  more
problematic from the U.S.  viewpoint, evidently because the proscription against gender- or race-
52based preferences conflicts with affirmative action notions at the state and federal levels.  There
is no attempt underway to ratify either convention in the United States.
The  fmal basic right  is freedom  from  the exploitation of  child labor.  The  ILO  has
approached this issue indirectly, by establishing Convention number 138, Minimum Age (1973).
It calls for setting a minimum age for entry into employment of age 15 or the end of compulsory
education, whichever is later.  If the work is dangerous or immoral, the minimum age should be
18 (reflecting some notion of what constitutes the age of majority), though definitions of what is
dangerous or immoral are left to national choice.  Exceptions from these rules are provided.  A
minimum age of  13 or  14 is acceptable for light work if it is  "not prejudicial" to educational
attainment.  Poor countries can set a minimum age of 14 (12 for light work) in general and of 16
for dangerous work.  Child labor is acceptable if it is an "integral part"  of a course of education
or  training  approved by worker  and employer groups and by competent authorities.  Finally,
exemptions exist for children working on family farms.
This  convention does  not  enjoy widespread support.  Only  46  countries had  ratified
number 138 as of November,  1995, though several countries have expressed an intention to do
so.  Numerous rich countries (Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and Switzerland are examples) object to various provisions of the convention and simply
refuse to ratify it.  For example, Canadian law (federal and provincial) does not provide for the
prohibition of work for persons under the school-leaving age, nor does it prohibit night work for
children under  age 13.  New Zealand has numerous restrictions on child employment,  but in
ways that are somewhat inconsistent with the provisions of the convention.  Switzerland has wide
sectoral exemptions from its minimum-age laws and has no legislation covering work outside a
formal  employment  relationship.  The  United  States  notes  several  inconsistencies  of  the
convention with its federal and state laws.  Mexico objects to the provisions on minimum ages
for dangerous work, citing their inconsistencies with its law, while Mozambique admits that it
lacks the educational infrastructure that could support ratification (ILO, 1995b).  In general, it is
clear  that  a  specifying a  minimum working  age  of  15 (or  18 for  hazardous jobs)  remains
unrealistic in  many developing countries, given the low frequencies with which  many young
people finish primary schooling.
On a more conceptual level, several nations object to the Minimum Age Convention for
its indirect approach to the issue of child labor exploitation.  A minimum age for work is not a
core labor standard per se.  On the one hand, some work of young people is not detrimental to
their  development nor  is  it coerced.  On the  other hand,  prohibiting  employment of  young
persons  may  force  them  into  worse  abuses  in  uncovered  sectors  or  in  areas  where  the
proscriptions are not enforced.  In short, the minimum-age approach does not distinguish work
from  exploitation.  The  convention  is  also  criticized  for  not  setting  out  safeguards  against
exploitation of child labor.
53Civic Rights
The civic  rights identified by Portes refer essentially to  rights of workers  to associate
freely  and  to  engage  in  unimpeded  collective bargaining  with  employers.  The  ILO  also
considers  these  rights  to  be  fundamental and  includes Convention number  87,  Freedom  of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (1948) and Convention number 98, Right to
Organize  and  Collective Bargaining (1949) in  its core  conventions.  Number  87  guarantees
freedom  of  association.  It  calls for  free  rights  to  establish and join  trade  unions,  with  no
formalities  such  as prior  authorization requirements, minimum membership requirements,  or
limits on the number of unions by enterprise or sector.  Trade unions are supposed to be free to
hold elections and administer their interests without governmental interference.  Rights to strike
are inherent in the convention, except for the military and police, whose rights in this regard are
subject to  national laws.  Convention number  98 extends the  scope  of protection  for  labor
organization,  calling for  no  discrimination in  employment decisions against union  members,
protection of organizations from interference by employers, and an exhortation to governments
to promote collective bargaining.
These conventions are among the most widely ratified.  Number 87 had been ratified by
114  countries  and  number  98  by  126 countries  by  November,  1995.  Nonetheless,  their
provisions  are  routinely  unobserved  by  developing  nations,  even  those  which  have  ratified
them.3 9 For example, Mexico has adopted number 87 but retains governmental rights to declare
strikes null and limits the number of unions per state enterprise.  Indonesia and Malaysia have
both ratified number 98 (not number 87) but place significant restrictions on rights to organize
(e.g.,  unions are disallowed in the Malaysian electronic sector) and onerous registration and size
requirements on trade unions.  At the same time,  despite having strong national labor laws,
Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States have refused to ratify one or both of
the conventions (both in the case of the United States).  Again, the issue is incompatibility of
laws with the conventions.  Canadian and American laws allow wider exclusions of collective
bargaining rights  or the right to  strike, while numerous states in the United States allow the
hiring of replacement workers, which practice could be construed as a restriction on the rights to
strike without interference.  Switzerland claims that language in the conventions precluding anti-
union discrimination is inconsistent with provisions of its labor law.
Indeed, rights to strike are typically limited to some degree even in developed nations.
These limitations, such as right-to-work laws and the ability to lock out and fire workers and to
replace them at will, are the subject of significant debate.  Such rights vary by country and even
by sub-regional authority within countries, without much attention paid to the proscriptions of
the  ILO  conventions.  At  the other  extreme, rights  to  strike can be  very  heavily  protected
through closed-shop rules, in which labor unions have nearly unlimited rights, perhaps coming at
the expense of employee rights.  That strong unions do not necessarily act in the interests of the
39See  OECD (1996).
54majority of  workers or  in the  interests of economic efficiency is recognized in  the labor-
economics  literature  (Farber, 1986).
These stories on ratification problems  point to difficulties  with the ILO conventions.
Ratification  of an ILO convention  by a country  is a commitment  to make its laws consistent  with
the convention  (although  it is more accurate to state that most countries  who ratify conventions
do so after their labor laws are already consistent). However, this does not mean that actual
labor practices will  meet stipulations  in the conventions.  A primary explanation  is that the
conventions  have no binding  powers of enforcement  (see below).  Indeed, the ILO has resisted
the  notion of  international  enforcement  of  its conventions on grounds that doing so could
severely limit ratification  and push many countries  out of the organization  altogether. On the
other hand, non-ratification  is not a meaningful  indicator of weak labor protection.  For one
thing, those countries  that consider  their laws to be in conformity  with conventions  may choose
not to undergo the cost of ratification  (Malaysia tends to make this claim frequently).  For
another, numerous countries with strong labor laws, such as Canada, Switzerland, and the
United States, find their  laws incompatible  with convention requirements, both for minor
technical  reasons and for substantive  reasons. This situation  makes questionable  the notion that
existing  ILO conventions  can serve as a meaningful  basis for an enforceable  international  social
clause  on minimum  labor protection.
55Table 2.  Ratification of Fundamental ILO Conventions by Selected Major Countries (November, 1995)
Country  No. 29  No. 105  No.  100  No. 111  No.  138  No. 87  No. 98
TOTAL RATIFICATIONS  138  116  124  119  46  114
126
United States  N  Y  N  N  N  N  N
Canada  N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  N
Japan  Y  N  Y  N  N  Y  Y
Australia  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y
New Zealand  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N  N
Belgium  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
France  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
Germany  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
Italy  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
Netherlands  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
Sweden  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
UnitedKingdom  Y  Y  Y  N  N  Y  Y
Switzerland  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  N
Argentina  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y
Brazil  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  N  Y
Chile  Y  N  Y  Y  N  N  N
China  N  N  Y  N  N  N  N
Egypt  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y
Honduras  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
India  Y  N  Y  Y  N  N  N
Indonesia  Y  N  Y  N  N  N  Y
Kenya  Y  Y  N  N  Y  N  Y
Rep. of Korea  N  N  N  N  N  N  N
Malaysia  Y  N  N  N  N  N  Y
Mexico  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  N
Mozambique  N  Y  Y  Y  N  N  N
Pakistan  Y  Y  N  Y  N  Y  Y
Philippines  N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y
Singapore  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  Y
South Africa  N  N  N  N  N  N  N
Thailand  Y  Y  N  N  N  N  N
Turkey  N  Y  Y  Y  N  Y  Y
Note: No. 29 is Forced Labor,  1930; No. 105 is Abolition of Forced Labor,  1957; No.  100 is Equal Remuneration,
1959; No.  111 is Discrimination (Employment and Occupation), 1958; No.  138 is Minimum Age,  1973; No. 87 is
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, 1973; No. 98 is Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining, 1949.
Sources:  Organization for  Economic Cooperation and  Development (1996) and International Labor Organization
(1995a, 1995b).
56MO  Complaint Mechanism
The second primnary  function the ILO serves is to act as a clearinghouse and  publicity
mechanism for complaints about both governmental and private actions that contravene national
obligations  in labor standards.  Each of the tripartite  representatives (of labor,  business,  and
government) in each country has standing to complain about practices in its own country and,
less frequently,  in  other countries.  An interesting distinction arises  here  between the ILO's
treatment of civil rights and basic rights.  The latter rights are the subject of complaints only in
nations that have ratified the relevant conventions.  The former rights -- freedom of association
and  collective bargaining  -- are  enshrined in the Preamble  of the ILO  Constitution and  are,
accordingly, taken to be incumbent on any country that joins the ILO, whether or not it ratifies
either or both of Conventions 87 and 98.  Consequently, complaints about limitations on trade
union rights and operations may be made about any country.  Further,  the  tripartite structure of
the  organization  leads  to  complaints that  focus  primarily  on  repression  of  association  and
bargaining  rights,  as these are the issues of  more immediate concern to  labor and  employer
interests.  As a result, the bulk of complaints are about these issues.
The process by which the ILO operates is based on persuasion and peer pressure.  A
Committee  of  Experts  issues  interpretations  on  operation  of  various  conventions,  thereby
evolving judicial  "meanings" for them.  Subject to these findings, the ILO compiles documents
on each country's  compliance with conventions it has ratified.  National actions are monitored
and  governments are  required to  report  on labor conditions and to justify  their  actions with
respect to working conditions.  Both worker and employer organizations are active in assessing
compliance  and  issuing complaints about practices.  Complaints are  typically lodged against
practices  in  developing  nations.  The  ILO  studies  these  complaints  and  its  findings  are
publicized, so that the offending, say, governmental restriction on bargaining rights or rights to
strike becomes widely known.  No other sanctions beyond public opinion exist.
It  is claimed that this approach has been reasonably effective in moderating repressive
behavior in a number of countries by shedding light on onerous practices.  The ILO's  tripartite
structure is also lauded as an efficient forum for discussion and consensus-building among major
groups interested in labor standards. 40 Others argue that the ILO structure and the absence of
any  binding  mechanisms  for  forcing  change,  such  as  trade  sanctions,  leaves  the  approach
fundamentally weak and insufficiently focused on basic rights. 41 Further,  there is the difficulty
that  if  labor  leaders  are  dependent  for  their  position on  government  indulgence,  they  are
considerably less likely to complain about labor repression than they would be in the idealized
ILO  vision  of  full  independence  among  groups.  Indeed,  a  surprisingly  high  portion  of
complaints are lodged against employer and government practices in democratic nations with free
40Interview with Francis Maupain  of the ILO, Geneva, February 20, 1996 and interview  with Edward Potter,
Attorney,  Washington,  February  5, 1996.
41lInterview  with Mark  Anderson,  AFL-CIO,  Washington,  February  5, 1996.
57institutions and strong labor protection.  This phenomenon presumably reflects the greater ability
of labor interests in those countries to take action without reprisals.
The ILO 's Position in the Trade and Labor Standards Debate
It  is fair to say that the ILO has grave concerns about the wisdom of writing a clause
protecting minimum labor standards into the procedures of the World Trade Organization (see
below).  However, it is actively considering its potential role in such an event, ranging from the
institution that defines and monitors minimum standards to one that recommends or mandates
trade sanctions.  In this context, there has been considerable debate within the ILO (for example,
workers'  groups from  OECD countries have argued for strongly interventionist standards but
have been opposed by workers'  groups from several developing countries).  This discussion has
led the ILO to the view that the provision of fundamental human rights (absence of forced labor,
rights  to freely  associate and collectively bargain,  elimination of exploitative child  labor,  and
absence of discrimination) is a necessary pre-condition for ensuring that workers share equitably
in  the  gains  from  trade  liberalization and global  integration (ILO,  1994).42  If  a  system  of
universal core labor standards were agreed upon and the ILO could verify that violations of these
CLS had happened, and that workers were being denied free choice, it would conclude that the
country in question was attempting not to share the gains from trade liberalization.  The ILO
would be prepared to consider a range of actions, ranging from standard publicity efforts through
establishing  a  "Social Policy Review  Mechanism,"  to  recommending trade  sanctions to  the
WTO.  At this point, all of these possibilities are speculative only and again, the ILO remains
wary of establishing a strong linkage with trade policy.
4.b.  The World  Trade  Organization
The  issue  of  establishing  formal  linkages  between  observance  of  minimum  labor
standards  and trade  restrictions has  a long history  (Charnovitz,  1987 and Woolcock,  1995).
Indeed, numerous participants to the conferences establishing the ILO advocated building such
linkages  into  its  Constitution but  the  attempt  failed.  The  Havana  Charter,  the  document
preparatory  to  the  establishment, which  failed,  of the  International Trade  Organization after
World  War  II,  noted that nations had  a  shared  interest in  fair  labor  standards and  that  the
maintenance of unfair conditions in production for  export activities resulted in  "difficulties in
international trade."  Article  Seven of the  charter exhorted members to  take  appropriate and
feasible actions to eradicate these unfair conditions.  When the ITO failed, all that remained of
relevance to labor standards was the set of allowable exemptions from basic obligations as set out
in Article XX of the GATT.  In particular, Article XX(e) allows countries to ban imports made
42 rlis statement is evidently not based on any analytical work at the institution, though the  Secretariat may be
asked  to perform such work in the near term.  It is not clear just what actions  would  constitute  "trade  liberalization,"
though  presumably  membership  in the WTO qualifies.
58by prison labor.  Note that this provision does not outlaw the use of prison labor itself, it simply
presents importing countries with the opportunity to refuse to import such goods.
Several times during the evolution of the GATT, American trade authorities attempted to
have language on fair labor standards introduced into the agreement, each time without success.
For  example, in  1953 the United States proposed a GATT provision  stating that unfair labor
standards,  especially in  export production,  "..create  difficulties in  international trade  which
nullify or impair benefits under this Agreement".  Labor practices were to be deemed unfair if
labor standards were maintained at levels "...below those which the productivity of the industry
and the economy at large would justify"  (Charnovitz, 1987).  The proposal was rejected by the
GATT,  although the United States indicated its position that trade  difficulties associated with
limited standards were actionable under Article XXIII.  This Article has not been invoked to date
in justification of trade restrictions.
At the Marrakesh Ministerial meeting adopting the Final Act of the Uruguay Round and
establishing  the  World  Trade  Organization,  negotiators  for  the  United  States  and  France
succeeded in procuring a commitment for further deliberation on the issue.  Little of substance
has  happened to  date  on this  score,  largely because of  the strong  opposition  of  many  key
developing countries, who see a strong possibility that such an obligation would lead to arbitrary
and protectionist limits on their exports.
A brief  review  of  proposed  means for  introducing  labor standards  into  the  WTO  is
instructive. 43 Because recognition of such minimum standards in  a global trading pact would
require acceptance of a new set of regulatory obligations on the part of many countries,  a legal
framework for stating and enforcing the obligations would need to be  negotiated.  The most
evident route for establishing this framework would be an expansion of the general exemptions
under  Article XX.  In this context, a failure to provide and enforce minimum labor standards
would constitute an action on the basis of which trading partners could suspend trade obligations
(in particular,  requirements for  non-discrimination would be  relaxed because  trade  sanctions
would be aimed at a particular country).  A prior requirement would be that some definition be
made of labor practices that are sufficiently offensive on a multilaterally agreed basis to support a
suspension of trade benefits.  Presumably, such a definition would be based on the core labor
standards as  advanced by  the ILO  but,  as is evident from  earlier discussion, there  would be
considerable difficulty in generating consensus on what many of these standards actually would
entail.  Other issues include whether ratification of existing (or revised) ILO conventions would
be  required,  what  would  constitute an  actionable  derogation  from  the  standards,  and  how
rigorously  to  place  restraints on  countries proposing  to  suspend trade.  By tradition,  GATT
Panels  have  placed  a  highly  rigorous  standard  on  invocation  of  Article  XX,  limiting  its
usefulness to countries proposing to restrict trade (Mattoo and Mavroidis,  1995).  In large part,
this is due to the fact that Article XX implicitly condones suspending trade benefits on the basis
of foreign production processes, while GATT rules mainly have been limited in interpretation to
4 3This  review  should  not be taken  to imply  advocacy  of any or all of the proposals  on the part of The World  Bank.
59trade in products,  irrespective of their manner of production.  This tradition, if carried over to
labor standards,  would leave little room for trade measures.  However, the health and morals
exceptions  in  Article  XX  have  been argued  to  apply both  to  products  and  processes  and
advocates of a labor-standards clause could extend this interpretation.
Article  XX  is  also  a  difficult route to  protection because  it  rigorously  requires  that
countries demonstrate the necessity of departing from GATT principles in order to correct the
problem.  In most instances, it is straightforward to demonstrate the technical possibility (if not
the  political  feasibility) of  more-direct,  less trade-restricting measures,  such  as  subsidies  to
foreign  governments  to  eliminate prison  labor.  Indeed,  no  WTO  member  has  successfully
invoked  Article  XX  to  justify  exceptions  to  the  basic  GATT/WTO  principles  of
nondiscrimination, leading some observers to consider it rigid and outdated.  If extended under
its present interpretation, the extension would be cold comfort to advocates of trade sanctions
against limited labor standards.  On the other hand, if Article XX were made more flexible in the
permissibility of trade sanctions, it would invite unilateral action against labor  standards on a
heretofore-unseen scale.  This danger might be  moderated by  involving the WTO  directly in
determination of circumstances under  which sanctions could be imposed multilaterally against
egregious violators.4  In any event, it would be no trivial matter simply to incorporate a further
general exception for labor standards into Article XX.  Negotiations would be required on the
defimition of minimum labor standards, conditions under which violations would be recognized,
and the form and severity of allowable trade sanctions.  Further,  to the extent that concern over
labor  standards,  such  as  inadequate protection of  freedom of  association rights,  is  aimed  at
political repression of those rights, the WTO would be put in a new position of making political
judgments  rather  than  focusing  on  trade  rules  --  a  potentially  quite  significant  change  in
procedure and philosophy.
A  second approach to  establishing a  legal framework would be  the negotiation of  a
multilateral accord (not unlike the TRIPs agreement) that would make WTO membership imply
the necessity of  observing minimum labor standards,  again as  set out by  existing or  revised
fundamental ILO conventions (or even standards negotiated de novo within a multilateral WTO
45 setting, which approach would basically declare the ILO incompetent in this area).  Such an
agreement would also require negotiation of criteria for detecting violations of labor standards
and provision of domestic enforcement mechanisms.  If such an accord were agreed, it would be
straightforward for contracting parties to invoke Article XXIII in claiming that violations of this
agreement  in  the  form  of  inadequate labor  protection  interfere  with  the  attainment  of  its
objectives and call  for  suspension of trade benefits to  remedy the problem  (de Wet,  1995).
4In effect, this final approach  would  be little different  from relying on the United  Nations  to approve sanctions
against nations violating fundamental  human rights, including labor rights.  It should be noted also that GATT Article
XXI permits countries to impose UN embargoes on peace and security grounds.  Such embargoes require  majority
votes in the General Assembly and to survive potential vetoes in the Security Council, removing from the WTO any
role in monitoring or implementing  them.
45This  approach  could also  be subsidiary  to use of Article  XX.
60Presumably such actions would be invoked multilaterally and only at the end  of a recognized
dispute-settlement process.
Assuming  a  legal  framework  is  established  in  which  minimum  international  labor
standards  are  defined  and  agreed,  countries  must  agree  also  on  allowable  processes  for
enforcement.  As suggested above, under an Article XX approach, nations would be allowed to
suspend trade benefits with  a violator country,  say through quantitative restrictions  or  higher
tariffs targeted on exports of particular products.  Sinilar  sanctions would apply under a separate
multilateral agreement on labor standards.  In both cases, presumably full access would be made
of dispute-settlement procedures.
It may be that sanctions would be multilateral in nature,  since it is difficult to imagine
inadequate labor standards in one country attracting interest on the part of importers in only one
other country.  This would be the case, for example, if Article XX exceptions were construed to
be  protests  against  the  (multilaterally perceived)  immorality  of  deficient  labor  standards.
Arguably,  this  multilateral character  of trade  sanctions would limit unilateral  enthusiasm for
applying the exceptions and would act as a strong signal of international disapproval to countries
found in violation.  In this view, the inherent motivation for allowing trade measures would be
based  on  some mutually agreed visions of morality.  However,  it seems  likely that any new
Article  XX  exceptions  would  be  invoked frequently  on  a  unilateral  basis,  especially if  the
perception becomes widespread that the multilateral process is excessively constrained.
A third approach to process might be to validate the concept of "social dumping" within
the  WTO  by  recognizing  that  limited application or  suspension of  labor  laws  on behalf  of
employers in export sectors or  EPZscould constitute an actionable subsidy in the same sense as
industry-specific or  firm-specific tax advantages or  capital subsidies.  Such a  provision  would
allow for a considerable extension of unilateral CVD authority to counteract trade advantages
presumed to result from social policies (as opposed to commercial policies) and clearly would
lead to numerous difficulties of interpretation and operation.  Note that this motivation for trade
measures is different; it is rooted in alleged damages to domestic industry and  laborers from
"subsidized" foreign exports.  I return to this notion in Section 5.
A variant of this approach has recently been advanced by Rodrik (1996), who advocates
allowing  nations  to  impose  "social  safeguards"  tariffs  against  countries  that  follow  labor
practices that can be shown, through a series of filters, to be morally reprehensible to a majority
of citizens in the importers.  His argument is that high-standard countries, such as the United
States, have expressed in their legislation social preferences against certain domestic production
technologies, such as child labor use and "sweat shops".  However, allowing free imports with
low-standard countries  is,  in his  view,  simply an  additional technology  that is  equivalent to
importing  foreign workers  and allowing them to  work under  these unacceptable conditions.
Accordingly,  importing nations should be allowed to prevent access to this technology as well
via trade restrictions.
61As  Srinivasan (1996) discusses,  acceptance of  this  proposal  would  pose  considerable
difficulties for the trading system.  Apart from technical difficulties in calculating appropriate
social tariffs, its  logic would open the WTO to trade sanctions imposed by countries for  any
purpose related to cost-raising domestic regulations.  Countries constrain or prohibit numerous
types  of  processes  for  environmental,  health,  aesthetic,  and  other  reasons.  Under  Rodrik's
approach, any such differences in domestic and foreign production regulations potentially could
invite tariffs to  offset resulting cost variations.  Further,  more efficient instruments than trade
restrictions  are  available  to  accommodate  humanitarian  concerns  about  international  labor
standards.  Finally,  as Anderson (1996) notes, experience with antidumping and countervailing
rules  in  the  United  States  suggests that  there  would  be  a  strong  likelihood  that  Rodrik's
procedures would be subject to capture by domestic producers.
Regardless of modalities chosen for introducing labor standards into the WTO,  if any, it
is inevitable that sanctions would be applied on a discriminatory basis, with the level of sanctions
chosen somehow being a function of the perceived severity of the standards violations and/or the
implicit  trade  damages  claimed by  the  sanctioning country  or  countries.  This  prospect  of
extensive  discrimination would present considerable difficulties for  the trading  system.  The
WTO  (and the GATT before it) is built on the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in
trade treatment.  The primary advantages of non-discrimination include promoting international
trade on an equal footing, thereby rewarding true comparative advantage, and providing smaller
nations with trade leverage to offset the power of larger countries.  To  the extent that a WTO
clause  on  minimum  labor  standards  would  open  the  door  to  selective  trade  sanctions,  a
considerable  constraint  on  the  ability  to  discriminate  would  be  removed  from  larger  and
wealthier nations.  One also has to question the notion that differences in labor standards present
a legitimate basis for trade sanctions in a rules-based system.
Strengthening International Surveillance
This  reasoning suggests that the WTO is not the appropriate international international
organization  to  deal  with problems  of trade-related labor  standards.  An  important  question
becomes how the ILO could be strengthened in order to  improve monitoring and reporting of
alleged  violations  of  CLS  and  to  discourage  such  practices.  Charnovitz  (1995)  discusses
proposals for this purpose, including establishing standing ILO Committees on Forced Labor and
Child Labor, promoting social labeling programs, facilitating codes of conduct, and encouraging
linkages between  development aid and  labor standards.  Note  that  labeling programs  could
require  some attention by the WTO's  Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade to ensure that
they do not become unfair trade barriers.  There could be further scope for cooperation between
the ILO and the WTO as well.
624.c.  United States Activities on International Labor Standards
The  United States has  been the most active nation in  working  to  link observance  of
"internationally recognized  workers'  rights"  to  trade  agreements.  First,  the  United  States
conditions  eligibility  for  trade  preferences  within the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative  (CBI),  the
Andean Trade Preference Trade Act (ATPA), and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)
for each country on an examination of "whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps
to  afford to workers  ...  internationally recognized worker rights."  The GSP statute allows all
interested parties to petition USTR to initiate a public review of whether a GSP country complies
with the statute's worker rights requirements and mandates an annual report on the status of such
rights in each beneficiary country.  Such information is provided in the State Department country
reports on human rights.
No country has been denied benefits on the basis of worker rights in the CBI or ATPA,
though the threat  of sanctions evidently induced improvements in  labor standards in Haiti,  the
Dominican Republic, and elsewhere.  Ten countries have been suspended from GSP beneficiary
status as a result of worker rights violations, though most have been reinstated upon indication of
progress.46 It remains unclear whether these improvements in the laws have been more cosmetic
or real in terms of impacts on local labor markets and employment.  For example, no one has
studied the impact of these changes on child employment in the formal and informal sectors of
these nations, nor on the conditions of work.
The  American application of the  GSP provision  has been  roundly  criticized by  labor
groups as politically motivated, in that suspension of benefits seems to have been concentrated in
"adversary" nations (e.g.,  Nicaragua, Liberia, and Syria) and to have been avoided in  "friendly"
nations with questionable records on labor rights (e.g.,  Egypt, Indonesia, and El Salvador).  At
the same time,  U.S.  trade  authorities maintain that the  program has  proved  instrumental in
persuading  some  countries  to  adhere  to  stricter  standards,  while business  groups  advocate
extending the use of GSP to promote labor standards on a multilateral basis.  47  In this context, it
is important to note that the European Union intends to extend the use of its GSP program for the
purpose  of  promoting  international  labor  standards.  Beginning  in  1998,  the  EU  will  tie
additional tariff preferences to acceptable behavior on worker rights.  It is interesting to note that
this position  implicitly provides an  income transfer from  European treasuries to  exporters  in
developing countries who meet the prescribed criteria.  In this view, the EU is evidently arguing
for conditioning foreign aid programs to private recipients on minimum labor standards.
Second,  Section 301 of U.S.  trade legislation authorizes the President to  impose trade
sanctions in response to  "unreasonable" acts that burden or restrict U.S.  commerce.  Explicitly
mentioned as unreasonable  acts are patterns  of behavior that deny  association and  collective
46  It is interesting  to note  that  most  of these  petitions  for suspension  were  filed  by the  AFL-CIO.
47United  States  Council  of Business  (1995)  and interview  with Edward  Potter, Attorney,  Washington,  February  5,
1996.
63bargaining rights, that permit forced labor, that fail to provide for minimum ages of child labor,
and that do not provide for minimum wages, maximum hours of work,  and occupational health
and safety.  Thus, American trade law goes beyond the level usually envisioned in the core labor
standards.  To date, no actions under Section 301 have been pursued, in part because such denial
of worker rights is most likely to engender action under GSP first.
Third,  since 1994 U.S. Executive Directors of international financial institutions, such as
the IMF,  the World Bank, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, are directed to use
the influence of the United States to promote worker rights as "an integral part of the institution's
policy dialogue with each borrowing country. "  The Treasury Department prepares reports on
the extent to which borrowing countries comply with internationally recognized worker rights.
Fourth,  the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) cannot guarantee projects in
countries that are not providing workers' rights or taking steps to provide them.  Moreover,  U.S.
investors  accepting  guarantees  from  OPIC  must  pledge  not  to  interfere  with  their  overseas
employees  exercising labor  rights  and to  observe  local labor  laws.  Negative determinations
under the GSP provisions above also preclude such countries from participating in OPIC,  while
OPIC has  also suspended countries on  its own terms (Korea in  1991, Ethiopia in  1987) and
issued discouragement to  investors in  Saudi Arabia,  Qatar,  and the United Arab Emirates.
Recent law also prohibits the Agency for International Development from using funds to  assist
any  activity that contributes to the violation of worker rights.  No reviews are available as to
how effective these guidelines have been in altering foreign behavior.
Fifth,  the United States retains the right to withdraw MFN  status from nonmembers of
GATT/WTO  for  reasons  of  denial  of  human  rights,  including  labor  rights.  In  1982,  for
example, Poland was removed from the MFN list because of its attempts to suppress the nascent
labor union movement.  This sanction is frequently discussed with respect to China, but has not
been imposed.
While each of the above programs is based on U.S. unilateral action, there is a significant
trilateral  agreement in the  form of the labor side agreement with Mexico and  Canada in  the
North American Free Trade Agreement.  The agreement commits each side to fulfillment of its
national  laws  regarding  eleven  labor conditions,  some  of  which  go  well beyond  core  labor
standards,  such as  minimum wages and the  treatment of migrant  workers.  It  is,  therefore,
fundamentally based  on the  principle of  mutual  recognition, though  it does  call  for  limited
enforcement mechanisms to be invoked in certain circumstances.
Interestingly,  sanctions cannot  be  invoked  to  induce  enforcement  of  laws  regarding
freedom of association, collective bargaining, and the right to strike, though complaints about
lack of enforcement can be raised to the level of Ministerial consultations after initial review by
national  administrative  offices.  For  example,  the  U.S.  Department  of  Labor  reviewed
complaints about the Mexican operations of Honeywell and General Electric in  1994, in which
the  allegations dealt  with  violations  of  union  rights.  The  Labor  Department  rejected  both
complaints because Mexican laws and judicial procedures, however weak, were not violated by
64the  firms  (Aggarwal,  1995).  Monetary  sanctions can  be  applied  as  a  last  resort,  after  an
extensive series of consultation and deliberation, in cases of child labor, minimum employment
conditions (e.g., minimum wages) and occupational safety and health.
It  is  too  early  to  assess  the effectiveness of the  NAFTA  labor  agreement.  It  is  a
distinctive  approach from  the  notion of common minimum international standards;  rather,  it
relies on examining enforcement and improvement of existing laws.  It has limited enforcement
procedures  (and  is,  therefore,  dismissed by  advocates  of  strong  labor  standards),  but  the
information  generated by  case  reviews  could have the effect  of  pushing  up  labor  standards
through  moral  suasion.  Accordingly,  the  NAFTA  agreement  opens  up  another  potential
approach to international labor standards.
Finally,  the  Uruguay  Round  Implementation  Act  requires  the  President  to  seek
establishment in the WTO of a working party to  consider the relationship of worker rights to
GATT  and  WTO  instruments.  Objectives of the working party would  include exploring  the
linkage  between international trade and worker rights,  the effects of denial of such rights  on
international trade, means of addressing such effects, and enforcement coordination possibilities
between the WTO and the ILO.
5.  Conclusions
Attempts to link international labor standards and trade policy have a long history, mostly
unsuccessful to date.  This report has provided a comprehensive overview and analysis of the
main issues and arguments in the current debate.  It is evident that considerably more analysis
could  be  sustained with  respect  to  particular aspects of  the  theory.  However,  some broad
conclusions are warranted.
First,  labor  standards vary  naturally across countries and  tend to  rise  with per-capita
income  levels.  Stronger  global  competition has  increased the perception that  differences  in
standards create competitive advantage and affect international wages.  Consumers in  wealthy
countries also have become increasingly concerned about unpleasant working conditions abroad.
These factors will only raise pressure on the global trading system to devise some solution.
Second,  a meaningful distinction may be made between core labor standards and other
labor standards.  The former are more properly the focus of international concern.  Core labor
standards can, in principle, undergird the efficient operation of labor markets.  However, CLS
can be set at excessively strong levels in terms of economic efficiency as well.
Third, the implications of weak CLS for competitiveness, trade, and wages are complex
and depend on characteristics of labor markets and production technologies.  For example, low
standards  could support  monopsony hiring  practices, which  reduces economic efficiency and
exports.  Introducing stronger union rights could offset this distortion and expand both  wages
65and  exports,  though  the  outcome  would  depend  on  union  preferences.  Further,  whether
monopsony labor practices can be sustained depends in part on global labor conditions.  A small
country exporting its labor services implicitly through labor-intensive exports will find its ability
to  set  local  wages  constrained.  However,  many  reasons  exist  to  explain  the  effective
segmentation of labor markets across countries.  These must be understood in order to analyze
the international impacts of differences in labor standards.
Fourth,  the notion that weak CLS generate a  significant spillover into lower wages of
unskilled workers in developed countries is doubtful, both in theoretical and empirical terms.  It
is also unlikely that the existence of limited CLS in developing countries will place significant
downward pressure on standards in developed countries.
Fifth, to the extent that limited CLS in poor countries is a source of distress to consumers
in rich countries, the latter should be willing to contribute to the moderation of the problem, and
any such solution would be less distortionary than trade sanctions.  A number of mechanisms
might be developed for this purpose, though all involve problems of international coordination.
Sixth,  the limited empirical evidence available suggests that  international variations  in
core labor standards  have little influence on trade performance, international prices, or foreign
direct investment.
Seventh, the ILO is a reasonably effective organization for publicizing certain problems
with labor standards in member countries.  Its ability to induce changes is indirect and based on
persuasion, however, and has, therefore, a spotty record.  The sporadic record of ratification of
core ILO  Conventions raises  questions about this  approach to  procuring global agreement on
CLS.
Eighth, advocates of strong international labor standards favor introducing a social clause
into the WTO in some form.  A number of ways in which this might happen were discussed.
However,  it  must  be  emphasized that  extending the  possibility  of  trade  sanctions  to  labor
standards would markedly raise the likelihood of trade discrimination and place real strains on
the global trading system.
Finally,  the overriding conclusion of this report is that using trade sanctions to penalize
nations for inadequate provision and enforcement of CLS is inadvisable.  The analysis indicates
that, in most relevant cases, tariffs are counterproductive in that they harm those individuals they
are  supposed to  help.  Indeed, to  the extent that limited CLS  are a  problem  in  informal  or
nontraded sectors, sanctions against exports can worsen their severity.  Tariffs can also backfire
by  pushing  the  most  vulnerable  workers  (children,  women)  into  less-desirable  alternative
activities and could reduce compliance with available labor standards by shifting resources  into
the infromal sector.  Further,  they are indirect instruments that may not achieve the goal for
which  they  are  imposed.  They  might  also  be  ineffective  in  that  there  could  be  ample
opportunities to circumvent the penalties if they are not imposed and monitored multilaterally.
Tariffs are also blunt instruments in that it would be difficult to use trade sanctions to penalize
66some offenders without also taxing firms with stronger labor practices.  Calculating meaningful
"social dumping tariffs"  would be virtually impossible and heavily subject to political capture.
In any event, such tariffs are misguided because they would be aimed at policies that generally
diminish competitiveness and exports, rather than raise exports.
Policy Recommendations
These conclusions are negative in tone, rather than pointing the way toward  beneficial
policies to adopt.  It is important to finish the report with a series of policy recommendations that
are supported by the analysis.
1.  There are clearly cases in which limited labor standards serve to reduce a country's  economic
efficiency and act as a drag on its growth.  Policy analysts or consultants could be instructed to
advise labor officials in developing countries about such problems and the gains from removing
them.
2.  Efforts should be made to improve the quality of, and access to, primary education for poor
children.  Programs  to  subsidize the purchase  of  school  supplies,  provide  transportation  to
school, and to reduce school fees make sense.  An effective truancy monitoring system would
also be helpful for enforcing minimum leaving-age regulations.
3.  On  an  international scale,  there  is  additional  scope  for  developing  private  and  public
mechanisms  to  reveal  the  extent  of  child  labor  in  production  processes  through  greater
information and more use of labeling schemes.  Coordination problems are endemic in this area,
however, suggesting that this approach cannot offer a full solution.
4.  Overall, there is virtually no economic case favoring the use of  bilateral or multilateral trade
penalties against labor  standards,  though the  United States and  the European  Union may be
expected to continue conditioning their  GSP systems in this context.  On the other hand,  the
economic case against such penalties is strong.
5.  If the WTO is not the appropriate international organization to address trade-related problems
in labor standards, an important question is how the ILO could be strengthened in its monitoring
and reporting of violations of CLS.
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76ANNEX ONE: ANALYTICAL MODELS FROM SECTION THREE
Model A. 1.  A Simple Model of Schooling Choice
Consider a representative household with a two-period utility function displaying Cobb-
Douglas preferences  over food (F) and other goods (Y), where food is subject to  a minimnum
consumption requirement:
max U =  (F,-F )YY' 1 +  P(F 2 -F*)aY 2
1-
subject to  PFF, + p,Yy +  PEE =  waLal  +  wclLcl
PFF2 +  PyY2 =  waLa2 +  wF,E
La2  =  Lc 1 ; E  =  C,-Lcl; WE2 =  yWa
Here,  the household maximizes utility with  a discount rate  of  P.  First-period children  (C,*)
either  work (Lc,) or attend school (E).  These children become adults in the second-period and
earn a wage premium (y) if they were educated.  There is a cost of attending school.  The choice
variables in this problem are F,, Y,  F2, Y2, and E.  Analytical solutions are complicated.  It is
more instructive to consider the demand for education that emerges from the comparative static
analysis:
D =  DE(PE;  wa,  P,  7, F,  C1l, PF9  PY)
Demand for education falls with a rise in its price and an increase in the minimum consumption
requirement.  It rises with the productivity of education. In equilibrium this demand to  attend
school would be set against the demand for child labor in the workplace.  That process would
generate an equality at the margin between the child-labor wage and the net return to education
less cost of education (an Euler equation).
This  simple  model  does  not  capture  much  of  the  complexity  in  schooling  choice,
including a fully dynamic treatment of human capital accumulation.  The model also does not
account  for  the possibility that children's  interests are inadequately represented  in  household
utility functions.  The model does point out,  however,  that the most  direct means of raising
incentives for attending school include reducing the cost of attendance and increasing the returns
to education.
77Model A.2.  Economy-Wide Wage Discrimination
Let there be two CRS sectors, X and Y, employing two factors, female labor and male
labor:
1.  X  =  f(LFX,LMX)
2.  Y  =  g(LFY,LMY)
The aggregate female-labor-supply curve is upward-sloping, while aggregate male labor supply is
fixed (relaxing this latter constraint would reinforce the results below).  For now I assume that X
is the exportable sector and that X is relatively female-labor-intensive, suggesting that our small
open economy is female-labor abundant.  This assumption is made to capture the evident belief
in some quarters that discrimination has the effect of lowering wages and creating competitive
advantage in export sectors.  Both factors are mobile between sectors, so that WF  and wM are
common  in  X  and  Y.  Without  discrimination, the  economy produces  at Q* in  Figure  Al,
consumes at C*, and the differences between these points indicate import and export volumes.
Real national income measured in terms of good X is at I*.
In this model, economy-wide wage discrimination consists of setting a maximum wage for
females,w F,  which lies below what the wage would be without discrimination, while not doing
so for males:
3  . WF  'W F
Here, the wage constraint is assumed to be binding, otherwise no effective discrimination would
exist in equilibrium.  The lower female wage reduces aggregate female employment, shifting the
production frontier in to F*, which is defined for the lower employment level and which I hold
fixed by assuming the constraint binds (the real female wage is fixed by the SOE assumption). 48
According to  the Rybczynski theorem, output would move to a point like Q.  Firms  in both
sectors minimize costs  subject to their production functions and this  constraint.  It  is easy to
show that this optimization generates:
4.  fLF/fLM  =  gLF/gLM  =W  F/WM ￿  WF*/WM
where  the last ratio is the relative female wage without discrimination at point Q . Since the
marginal rates of technical substitution are equal in X and Y, the economy operates on the lower
production frontier. The change in relative wages requires a shift in output toward sector Y, the
male-labor-intensive  good,  implicitly  maintaining  the  constraint  on  female  wages.  The
constrained equilibrium production point is at Q . The non-tangency between prices and the
production frontier reflects the wage constraint.  For example, if sector X were to expand output
beyond this  point, hiring more female labor would put upward  pressure on the female wage,
which is fixed by the discrimination.  Accordingly, there is no inframarginal impact on female
48See Martin (1976)  for analysis  of endogenous  labor-supply  responses.
78wages and average cost exceeds marginal cost in sector X.  Thus, the effects of economy-wide
wage discrimination against females are:
*  female wages are lower,  and  male wages higher,  in the distorted equilibrium than  they
would be without discrimination;
*  output contracts in the exportable sector (because it is intensive in female labor);
*  as  a  result,  trade  volumes  decline,  assuming  preferences  for  goods  are  reasonably
homothetic;
*  the economy's real income declines to I,  which decline can be considered its "investment" in
preferences to discriminate.
Figure Al.  Economy-Wide Wage Discrimination
O  T  I
79Model  A.3.  Sectoral  Employment  Discrimination
Suppose  there is employment  discrimination  in the export sector X.  It is easy to show
that in equilibrium:
5.  fLF/fLM  =  (wF  +  X)/wM  >  gLF/gLM  =  WF/WM
where X is the Lagrange multiplier on the X-sector female employment constraint: LFX  <  L.
Because  the technical  rates of substitution  are different  in the two sectors, the economy  operates
on the "shrunken-in"  production  frontier  DF shown  in Figure  A2.  In comparison  to the initial
equilibrium  at Q*, the displaced  female  workers must move to sector Y, reducing  female  wages
in both sectors and raising  the male wage.  The zero-profit  condition  in sector X also guarantees
that male workers move to sector Y.  Thus, output rises in Y and falls in X to a point like Q.
Thus,  employment discrimination in the exportable sector reduces output to  the other  industry
and reduces export volume.  The economy again pays an efficiency cost in reduced real income.
To summarize the results:
*  sectoral employment discrimination reduces the female wage and raises the male wage;
*  export volume falls if the discrimination is in the exportable sector but rises if it is in the
importable  sector;





I'  I  X
Figure A2: Employment  Discrimination
49In fact, this PPF could have a convex  range.
80ANNEX TWO.  DETERMINANTS  OF INTERNATIONAL  WAGE  SPILLOVERS
Consider the model in Figure A3.  There, I depict the undistorted PPF,  Fo, as being consistent
with the absence (or, more accurately, the market-determined level) of core labor standards, such
as union rights.  Firns  in both sectors are competitive. The introduction of strong union rights,
which I model here as an institution setting a minimum wage in the export sector X, has the
effect of setting a binding maximum output of X at level XI.  This is the standard outcome in the
basic Harris-Todaro model (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1983).  (Alternatively, we could imagine a
stronger minimum age for child labor, which would shift the PPF in throughout its length, with
the larger  reduction  on the  X axis).  The  minimum wage  generates unemployment,  causing
output to  lie along the vertical line at the constrained X level.  The horizontal distance 01Q1
therefore represents the export offer in the presence of union rights.
Y
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Figure  A3:  Trade  Effects  of  Union  Rights
Px
pi  - --  - - --  - - ----  X  E
p*  A
......  .........  .......  ....  ..  --- ,-.-.---.-X---
0  Q*  EX,
Figure  A4:  Price  Effects  of  Union  Rights
81Now  suppose  that  the  union  rights  are  suppressed,  so  that  labor  markets  are
competitive. 50 Output shifts to Q*, consumption to C*, and the export offer is higher at O*Q*.
Note that the effect is to raise output of X and (probably) to reduce output of Y.  Unless there is
a  substantial outward  shift in  the  PPF,  the  economy cannot  "create"  additional comparative
advantage in X without destroying some output in the rest of the economy.
In Figure A.4 I indicate how the change in world price of X is established.  I hold the
price of Y constant, so shifts in relative prices are equivalent to changes in the price of X.  The
curve Ix is the import-demand schedule in the rich countries, say the United States.  In the initial
equilibrium at point Al the export volume is OQI.52  The new equilibrium at point A  involves a
higher import volume and a lower price for good X.  Notice that if the import-demand curve
were perfectly elastic, meaning that the exporter were a small country, the impact on price in the
importing country would be nil.  Thus, for any wage spillovers to occur there must be some less-
than-infinite elasticity in import demand.  This elasticity itself is a function of preferences in the
importer and the initial volume of trade in this good.  In particular,  note that if limited union
rights are provided only in isolated and small export sectors (e.g.,  those with a small share of
global trade), there will be little impact on foreign prices.
Thus, the reduction in import price is a function of the following parameters:
(dP/P)  =  f([w/w*  L 0Kx'OKy,rx,y4;6  R)
Here,w  /w* is the ratio of the unionized wage to the non-unionized wage, taken as an index of
the  extent  of the  union  distortion.  The  O's and  a's  are  capital  shares  (measures of  factor
intensities) and substitution elasticities in each sector.  These parameters essentially determine the
movements along the PPF.  Parameter  4  is a composite demand elasticity for good X  in the
exporting  country,  incorporating  both  relative-price  and  real-income  impacts  on  demand.
Finally,  ER is the import-demand elasticity in the importing nation.  It  is a general-equilibrium
concept,  depending  on  a  composite  demand  elasticity  and  the  extent  of  a  shift  along  the
importer's PPF.
50Some advocates  of strong labor standards  no doubt imagine that the effect of repressed  labor standards  is to
generate  monopsony  labor practices rather than competitive  labor markets. This may be true, but the implication
would  be a smaller increase  in trade (or even  a decline  in trade), yielding  a smaller  spillover  impact  into international
wages.
51Whether the economy actually is better off in this situation depends on its underlying preferences for core labor
standards.
52I do not draw an export-supply curve through point Al, since it would not be well-defined in the presence of a
union (and/or a monopsony) without more information on its preferences.
82Knowledge of the international price change is not enough, for there must be a mapping
into wage changes in the importing country.  While these effects are complicated in a many-good
model, with two goods and two factors I can appeal directly to the Stolper-Samuelson equation:
(dw/w)  = (dP/P)OKy/(OKy - OK)
Notice that the wage change depends on how similar factor intensities are.  If both X and Y have
similar capital intensities the wage impact is substantial.  However, if factor intensities are quite
different (as would be  the case for textiles, apparel, and electronics as importables) the wage
effect is muted.
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